Determining Extraterritoriality by Gevurtz, Franklin A.
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 56 | Issue 2 Article 2
Determining Extraterritoriality
Franklin A. Gevurtz
Copyright c 2014 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation








This Article addresses an underexplored but critical aspect of the
presumption against extraterritoriality. The presumption against
extraterritoriality—which the United States Supreme Court has
increasingly invoked in recent years—calls for courts to presume that
Congress does not intend U.S. statutes to govern events outside the
United States. The most difficult issue presented by the presumption
arises when relevant events occur both inside and outside the United
States, as in the classic example, if a shooter on one side of the border
kills a victim on the other, or if, as in the leading case, false state-
ments originating inside the United States impact the price paid in
purchasing stock outside the United States. How should a court
decide whether such cases involve extraterritoriality and trigger the
presumption? In a world in which both the performance and impact
of regulated activities increasingly occur within more than one
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nation, the need for courts to resolve this sort of question is likely to
arise with increasing frequency.
In Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., the United States
Supreme Court established the Court’s test for resolving this
question: determining extraterritoriality based upon the location of
the event that constitutes the “focus” of the statute at issue. Yet, if the
focus of the statute determines extraterritoriality, what is the test for
determining the focus of the statute? The Court’s answer was to
evaluate the language and purpose of the statute in order to see
whether Congress intended it to reach the events in question when
they take place outside the United States. The result is entirely
circular because it required the Court to determine whether Congress
intended the statute to reach the situation in order to invoke the
presumption to determine whether Congress intended the statute to
reach the situation.
This Article argues that a better approach determines extraterrito-
riality in light of the purposes for the presumption against extraterri-
toriality: specifically whether applying the statute to the situation
before the court will trigger international relations concerns. I
explore the parameters and implications of this approach. This
includes considering approaches to determine when applying U.S.
law to situations involving events both inside and outside the United
States triggers international relations concerns, and noting some of
the unusual implications of this approach—for example, that inter-
national relations concerns may sometimes call for a presumption in
favor of applying U.S. law to a situation involving events both inside
and outside the United States.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court resolved significant cases by
invoking the presumption against extraterritoriality twice in the
last four years.1 This presumption calls for the Court to interpret
U.S. statutes, in the absence of evidence of intent to the contrary, as
not applying to events outside the nation’s borders.2 The Court’s
current affinity for the presumption follows a trend that began a
little over twenty years ago3 and seems likely to continue in the
future.
The most difficult issue presented by the presumption against
extraterritoriality is determining when a proposed application of a
statute actually involves extraterritoriality so as to trigger the
presumption. To use the classic illustration,4 if a person standing
within the United States shoots a rifle and kills a victim standing
across the border in Mexico, or if a person in Mexico shoots a rifle
and kills a victim standing within the United States, would
prosecuting the shooter under domestic law in the United States for
murder involve, in either case, extraterritorial application of the
domestic law? Or, to give a more likely example, if a corporation
makes a false statement in the United States that impacts the price
paid for its stock in sales taking place overseas, or if a corporation
makes a false statement overseas that impacts the price paid for its
stock in the United States, would the United States be applying its
law extraterritorially, in either case, by prosecuting the corporation
for violating the U.S. law prohibiting fraud in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security? A court might say there is extraterri-
toriality in these examples and invoke the presumption because it
would be applying domestic law to events—conduct, effect of the
conduct, or elements of the prohibited act—that occurred beyond our
1. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (holding that the Alien
Tort Statute does not reach conduct inside other nations); Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd.,
130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (holding that section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act does not
reach fraudulent conduct impacting sales of securities outside the United States).
2. E.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (ARAMCO), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
3. See infra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 18 illus. 2 (1965) [hereinafter 2D RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW].
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borders. On the other hand, in each of these examples, a court might
say there is no extraterritoriality and the presumption is irrelevant
because it is applying domestic law to conduct, effects, or elements
of the prohibited act that took place within the United States. Or,
for all these examples, a court might say that whether the situation
involves extraterritoriality depends upon the statute and the speci-
fic circumstances. In a world in which both the performance and
impact of regulated activities increasingly occur within more than
one nation, the need for courts to resolve this sort of question is
likely to arise with increasing frequency.
The U.S. Supreme Court established its test for answering this
question in its 2010 decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank
Ltd.5 This test looks to the location of the event that constitutes the
“focus” of the statute. If the event that constitutes the focus of the
statute occurs outside the United States, the situation involves
extraterritoriality; if the event that constitutes the focus of the
statute occurs inside the United States, the situation does not
involve extraterritoriality.6 Yet, if statutory focus provides the test
for determining if the situation involves extraterritoriality, what is
the test for determining the statutory focus? For example, is the
statutory focus of the law against murder the act of pulling the
trigger with intent to kill, or is it the fatal impact of the bullet
striking the victim? 
In Morrison, the Supreme Court held that the focus of the U.S.
law prohibiting fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a
security was the sale, not the fraud, and hence the prohibition did
not reach the plaintiffs’ claim that misrepresentations originating
in the United States impacted the price they paid for their stock in
Australia.7 Critically, however, the reasons the Court gave for
concluding that the sale was the focus of the statute involved
various arguments, ranging from the language of the statute to
policy considerations, which suggested to the Court that Congress
did not intend the statute to reach fraud in connection with sales
outside the United States.8 This makes the test entirely circular
5. 130 S. Ct. 2869.
6. Id. at 2884.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 2882.
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because the purpose of asking whether the claim involves extraterri-
toriality is to decide whether to invoke the presumption as a means
to determine Congress’s intent. The circularity of the statutory focus
test renders the presumption against extraterritoriality useless
except in easy cases in which none of the challenged conduct or its
effects occurs in the United States.
This Article proposes a better test for determining extraterritori-
ality in situations involving misconduct with performance or effect
occuring both inside and outside the United States. Instead of
looking to the focus or purpose of the statute, this Article proposes
looking to the purpose of the presumption against extraterritorial-
ity. Specifically, this Article advocates looking to the potential
impact on international relations of applying the statute to the
situation at hand in order to decide whether there is extraterritori-
ality. Put simply, if the situation is one in which the effort to apply
U.S. law to events reaching outside the United States will trigger
hostile foreign government reaction, the Court should demand some
indication that this is what Congress really had in mind; if the
situation is one in which no such reaction is likely, then the Court
should determine whether Congress intended the statute to reach
the situation in the same manner that the Court interprets statutes
generally and without prejudging Congress’s intent.
Determining the likely foreign government reaction may often not
be straightforward, and this Article explores some approaches to
address this question. This Article also explores some of the im-
plications of determining extraterritoriality by the impact on
international relations from applying U.S. laws to misconduct
involving conduct or effect occurring both inside and outside the
United States. For example, this Article will argue that the
international relations rationale suggests that the presumption
should work both ways: specifically, in situations in which failure to
extend U.S. laws to misconduct risks a negative impact on interna-
tional relations, there should in fact be a presumption in favor of
applying the nation’s laws even though some conduct or effect occurs
outside the United States.9
9. See infra Part III.C.
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This Article will proceed in three parts. Part I will provide some
background regarding the presumption against extraterritoriality
and the problem that courts face in determining whether a given
claim, arising out of conduct or effect in more than one nation,
entails extraterritoriality, so as to trigger the presumption. Part II
will discuss the Supreme Court’s effort to resolve this problem in
Morrison, as well as in a concurring opinion in the recent Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. decision, in which two Justices discussed
how Morrison’s statutory focus test would apply to the Alien Tort
Statute.10 Part II also discusses quixotic recent efforts by lower
federal courts to apply the statutory focus test to claims that events
inside and outside the United States violated RICO. Part III then
sets out a framework for determining whether a claim involves
extraterritoriality based upon the three basic rationales for the
presumption against extraterritoriality. After finding that a test
looking to the presence of international relations concerns is the
only one of the three rationales that enables the presumption
against extraterritoriality to serve any useful purpose when
activities straddle national borders, Part III explores the parame-
ters and implications of this test.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
In a simpler time, issues of applying U.S. law beyond the young
nation’s borders arose on ships and involved pirates,11 murder at
sea,12 and customs duties.13 By the twentieth century, an industrial-
ized and powerful United States was dealing with those who used
subtler means to enrich themselves at the expense of others.
Congress responded with statutes to protect consumers, competi-
tors, workers, investors, and the like.14 As economic transactions
10. 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662-64 (2013); id. at 1669-70 (Alito, J., concurring).
11. E.g., United States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144 (1820).
12. E.g., United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184 (1820).
13. The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 368-69 (1824).
14. E.g., Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (2012) (protecting consumers and competitors
from combinations in restraint of trade and monopolization); Securities Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-78pp (2012) (protecting investors); Eight Hour Law, 40 U.S.C. §§ 324-25 (1940)
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increasingly crossed national boundaries, issues arose regarding the
degree to which such statutes applied to events that occurred in
other nations. Courts responded with decisions applying or refusing
to apply U.S. antitrust laws,15 employment laws,16 securities laws,17
and trademark laws,18 as well as a variety of other laws,19 to activ-
ities abroad.
In the course of deciding these cases, the Supreme Court often
referred to rules of construction or presumptions regarding Con-
gress’s intent with respect to applying U.S. laws to events beyond
our borders. In its early decisions dealing with murder at sea and
enforcing customs duties, the Court explained that even though a
statute used broad, general language regarding its reach, the Court
presumed that Congress only intended to legislate within Congress’s
“authority and jurisdiction.”20 It is debatable whether this referred
to legislating only with respect to events within the territory of the
United States or legislating only within the limits imposed by
international law on the permissible reach of a nation’s statutes.21
Justice Holmes’s opinion in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit
Co. marked an important point in the evolution of the law in this
area when he stated that the presumed limit is one of territory.22
Specifically, Justice Holmes asserted that the legality of an act
nearly universally depends upon the law of the nation in which it
takes place, which, in turn, leads courts to construe statutes only to
apply within the nation’s territorial limits.23
(repealed 1962) (protecting workers through wage and hour regulation).
15. See F. Hoffmann-La Roche v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164-65 (2004); infra notes
22-24 and accompanying text.
16. See Jonathan Turley, “When in Rome”: Multinational Misconduct and the Presumption
Against Extraterritoriality, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 598, 617-27 (1990) (discussing cases dealing
with extraterritorial application of U.S. employment law); infra notes 25-26 and accom-
panying text.
17. See infra notes 57-68 and accompanying text.
18. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
19. E.g., Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197 (1993) (involving the Federal Torts Claim
Act); Turley, supra note 16, at 627-34 (discussing cases dealing with extraterritorial
application of U.S. environmental protection laws).
20. The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370 (1824). 
21. E.g., John H. Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J. INT’L L.
351, 363-66 (2010).
22. 213 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1909).
23. Id. at 359.
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Justice Holmes’s strict notions of territoriality subsequently fell
out of favor in the very field in which American Banana arose, as
courts increasingly applied U.S. antitrust laws to overseas conduct
that had an effect in the United States.24 In employment law,
however, the Supreme Court continued to invoke a presumption
against applying U.S. laws to events beyond our territory—extrater-
ritoriality—in order to construe U.S. law as not reaching labor
practices outside the United States.25 This hit an important
milestone in the Court’s 1991 decision in EEOC v. Arabian Ameri-
can Oil Co. (ARAMCO), in which the Supreme Court invoked the
presumption against extraterritoriality in order to hold that the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act did not apply to the discrimina-
tory firing of an American citizen by an American company when
the firing took place in Saudi Arabia.26 ARAMCO marked a turning
point in the frequency with which the Supreme Court invoked the
presumption against extraterritoriality. Whereas the eight decades
between American Banana and ARAMCO saw the Supreme Court
decreasingly invoke the presumption to restrict the application of
U.S. statutes,27 in the two decades since ARAMCO the presumption
has found much greater favor in the Supreme Court’s eyes.28
The Supreme Court’s growing fondness toward the presumption
against extraterritoriality has, not surprisingly, drawn scholars to
the topic.29 Although these scholars disagree regarding what the
24. E.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993); United States v. Sisal
Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443
(2d Cir. 1945).
25. E.g., Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 282 (1949) (holding that the Eight Hour Law
did not apply to employment overseas).
26. 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
27. William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 85, 91 (1998) (explaining how the Supreme Court did not invoke the
presumption against extraterritoriality in the four decades after applying it to the Eight Hour
Law in 1949, even though it had opportunities to do so).
28. Id. at 87 (listing Supreme Court opinions invoking the presumption against extrater-
ritoriality in the decade following ARAMCO); see also supra note 1 and accompanying text.
29. E.g., Lea Brilmayer, New Extraterritoriality: Morrison v. National Australia Bank,
Legislative Supremacy, and the Presumption Against Extraterritorial Application of American
Law, 40 SW. U. L. REV. 655 (2011); Hannah L. Buxbaum, Territory, Territoriality, and the
Resolution of Jurisdictional Conflict, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 631 (2009); Anthony J. Colangelo, A
Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L. REV. 1019 (2011); Dodge, supra note 27;
Knox, supra note 21; Larry Kramer, Extraterritorial Application of American Law After the
Insurance Antitrust Case: A Reply to Professors Lowenfeld and Trimble, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 750
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Court should do with the presumption,30 on one point there seems
widespread agreement: the Court has made a hash of the subject.31
Inconsistencies in the Court’s opinions abound. Some opinions rely
on the presumption, whereas other opinions dealing with applica-
tion of U.S. law to events beyond the nation’s borders barely, if at
all, mention it.32 The Court cannot make up its mind about the
purposes for the presumption33 and its relationship to the presump-
tion against violating international law.34 The Court’s opinions
differ on the evidence of legislative intent necessary to overcome the
presumption.35 Finally, Supreme Court opinions are confusing or
inconsistent regarding when a claim involves extraterritoriality, so
(1995); Jeffrey A. Meyer, Dual Illegality and Geoambiguous Law: A New Rule for
Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law, 95 MINN. L. REV. 110 (2010); Austen L. Parrish, The
Effects Test: Extraterritoriality’s Fifth Business, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1455 (2008); Yaad Rotem,
Economic Regulation and the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality—A New Justification,
3 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 229 (2012).
30. E.g., Colangelo, supra note 29, at 1022-28 (advocating that courts limit the presump-
tion to situations in which the law comes from unilateral (domestic) as opposed to multilateral
(international) sources); Dodge, supra note 27, at 90-91 (advocating that courts base the
presumption on the absence of effects in the United States); Knox, supra note 21, at 353
(advocating that courts base the presumption on international law rules regarding jurisdiction
to apply a nation’s law); Meyer, supra note 29, at 119-21 (advocating that courts limit the
presumption to situations in which only one nation prohibits the conduct); Parrish, supra note
29, at 1462 (advocating that courts reject the effects test as a basis for extending the reach of
U.S. laws).
31. E.g., Colangelo, supra note 29, at 1021, 1028 (“[T]he only thing ... scholars [writing on
the presumption against extraterritoriality] seem to agree on is that the law in this area is
a mess.”).
32. E.g., Kramer, supra note 29 (contrasting ARAMCO with Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993), in which the Supreme Court does not explicitly mention the
presumption).
33. Compare Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (quoting
ARAMCO’s statement that the presumption against extraterritoriality “serves to protect
against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result
in international discord”), with Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878
(2010) (stating that the presumption against extraterritoriality is not about comity or avoiding
conflicts with other nations’ laws).
34. See infra notes 201-04 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court opinions
dealing with the relationship between the presumption against extraterritoriality, the pre-
sumption against violations of international law, and interpreting the reach of statutes to
avoid conflicts with foreign laws).
35. E.g., Dodge, supra note 27, at 96-97 (discussing statements by the Supreme Court in 
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 176-77 (1993), Smith v. United States, 507
U.S. 197, 201-04 (1993), and EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (ARAMCO), 499 U.S. 244
(1991), with different formulations for the amount of evidence necessary to overcome the
presumption).
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as to trigger the presumption.36 This Article focuses on this last
problem, although the lack of clarity about the purposes of the
presumption against extraterritoriality and its relationship to the
presumption against violating international law complicates our
inquiry.
B. The Problem of Identifying Extraterritoriality
In many cases, it is easy to determine that a claim involves the
extraterritorial application of a U.S. statute. So, for example, in the
recent Kiobel case, all of the conduct by the Nigerian military
alleged to violate international human rights law, as well as all of
the conduct by the defendant corporations alleged to have aided and
abetted this conduct—thereby, the plaintiffs argued, creating a
claim under the U.S. Alien Tort Statute—took place in Nigeria, and
the plaintiffs pointed to no impact of this conduct in the United
States.37 Under these circumstances, normally, the nation38 in which
the wrongful conduct took place would apply its law to prosecute the
defendants, reflecting the traditional approach under which laws
govern events taking place within the nation’s own territory.39 This
is not to say, however, that nations do not sometimes prosecute
wrongful conduct that only occurs and creates an impact in another
nation’s territory. This might happen, for example, because the
victim was a citizen of the nation seeking to prosecute (sometimes
36. Beyond the problem addressed in this Article with the Supreme Court’s approach to
situations involving conduct or effect in more than one nation, the Court has been inconsistent
with respect to whether ships or bases constitute U.S. territory for purposes of determining
extraterritoriality. E.g., Knox, supra note 21, at 390-92.
37. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663-65.
38. Within the term “nation,” I include political subdivisions of nations, such as “states”
within the United States of America, which prosecute crimes such as murder committed
within the political subdivision.
39. E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 402 cmt. c (1986) [hereinafter 3D RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW] (“The
territorial principle is by far the most common basis for the exercise of jurisdiction to pre-
scribe.”); INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON EXTRATERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION 11 (2009) [hereinafter IBA REPORT], available at http://perma.cc/9X89-99G8,
(“The starting point for jurisdiction is that all [nations] have competence over events occurring
and persons ... present in their territory. This principle, known as the ‘principle of
territoriality’, is the most common and least controversial basis for jurisdiction.”).
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referred to as the passive personality principle);40 because the
defendant is a citizen of the nation seeking to prosecute (referred to
as the nationality or active personality principle);41 because of some
special interest of the nation in the misconduct (for example, the
victim was undertaking an important task for the government of the
nation seeking to prosecute leading the nation to assert jurisdiction
based upon the protective principle);42 or, as particularly relevant to
Kiobel, because the special nature of the crime, such as piracy or
genocide, gives all nations jurisdiction to prosecute based upon
universal jurisdiction.43 In any of these cases in which a nation
might seek to prosecute wrongful conduct with no connection to its
territory, one can say that the nation is applying its law extra-
territorially.
Applying the concept of extraterritoriality becomes less straight-
forward as events straddle borders. In the classic example, the
defendant, who is standing in one nation, shoots a rifle and kills the
intended victim, who is standing near the border in another nation.
In which nation’s territory does the wrong occur: the nation of the
act or the nation of the injury? Although some early court opinions
viewed this as a situation in which the defendant’s conduct occurred
in both nations—based upon the metaphysical notion that the
defendant’s conduct traveled with the bullet44—the general view is
that this situation involves conduct in one nation—where the
defendant pulled the trigger—and an effect in another na-
40. E.g., 3D RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 39, § 402 cmt. g; IBA
REPORT, supra note 39, at 147 (“Of the 27 [nations] surveyed for this chapter, just over half
adopted some version of the passive personality principle of jurisdiction, although generally
only for certain crimes.”).
41. E.g., 3D RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 39, § 402(2); IBA
REPORT, supra note 39, at 145 (“Almost all (25 out of 27) of the [nations] surveyed for this
chapter grant some degree of jurisdiction to their courts based on the active personality
principle, in the sense of criminalising certain conduct by nationals under domestic law.”).
42. E.g., 3D RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 39, § 402(3); IBA
REPORT, supra note 39, at 150 (“Of the 27 [nations] surveyed for this chapter, 22 have enacted
legislation based on some form of the protective principle.”).
43. E.g., 3D RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 39, § 404; IBA REPORT,
supra note 39, at 153 (“A majority of the [nations] surveyed for this chapter (25 out of 27)
provide for some form of universal jurisdiction to be exercised by national courts.”).
44. See, e.g., Simpson v. State, 17 S.E. 984, 985 (Ga. 1893) (“[I]f a man in the State of
South Carolina criminally fires a ball into the State of Georgia, the law regards him as
accompanying the ball, and as being represented by it, up to the point where it strikes.”).
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tion—where the bullet struck the victim.45 Hence, this example
illustrates that prohibited conduct may have a connection to a
territory either by occurring there or by creating an effect there.
Whether one views the situation through the lens of where conduct
and effect occur, or through the lens of where the necessary
elements of a crime took place, the example shows that situations
can arise in which one might say that a prohibited act occurs in
more than one nation. In such an event, the critical question for
purposes of the presumption against extraterritoriality is whether
either nation would be applying its law extraterritorially if, in this
example, it prosecuted the shooter for murder.
There are three answers to this question: yes, no, and maybe. The
affirmative answer follows from what I will label the “half-empty”
viewpoint because it requires all contacts to be within a single
nation in order to avoid extraterritoriality. Under this view, both
nations in the cross-border shooting example would be applying
their law extraterritorially if they prosecuted the defendant for
murder because they would be prosecuting a crime in which some
of the conduct or effect—or the elements—took place in another
nation.46 At the other extreme is what I will label the “half-full”
viewpoint because it requires only some contact within a nation in
order to avoid extraterritoriality. Under this view, neither of the na-
tions in the cross-border shooting example would be applying law
extraterritorially if either prosecuted the defendant for murder
because, for both, at least some of the conduct, effect, or elements of
the crime took place in that nation.47 In between these two view-
points is middle ground in which one nation might be applying its
law extraterritorially and one might not. For example, a highly
traditional view would be that a nation punishing the conduct of
pulling the trigger within the nation’s territory would not be
45. See, e.g., 2D RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 4, § 18 cmt. c, illus.
2; STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY, UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL LAW 178 (2006) (referring to
subjective and objective territoriality as where the act and the injury occur, respectively).
46. E.g., Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth
Amendment Due Process, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1217, 1218 & n.3 (1992) (using the term extrater-
ritoriality to refer to a case in which at least one relevant event occurs in another nation).
47. See, e.g., 3D RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 39, § 402(1)-(2) &
cmt. d (treating situations in which either conduct or effect occurs within a nation as creating
jurisdiction to apply a nation’s law based upon territoriality).
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applying its law extraterritorially, whereas a nation punishing
conduct that occurred elsewhere would be applying its law
extraterritorially, even though the conduct elsewhere produced an
effect (the death) within the nation’s territory.48
Although cross-border shootings may not be common, it has
become a sad fact of modern life that terrorist activities often
straddle national borders as plots hatched in meetings in one part
of the world are consummated with death and destruction in
another. Less dramatic, but more prevalent, are activities in cross-
border drug smuggling, human trafficking, computer hacking, and
similar criminal activities that involve conduct and effect in more
than one nation.49 Shifting to “white collar” misdeeds, violations of
laws governing business commonly involve conduct and impact in
more than one nation. For example, producers bent upon price
fixing may form their cartel and agree on prices or production in
secret meetings in one part of the world, implement their agreement
through their pricing and production decisions in other nations in
which they make and sell their product,50 and create an impact in
yet other nations whose consumers pay more because of the global
impact of reduced supplies and higher prices.51 With multinational
corporations and the global trading of securities, it may be not only
increasingly difficult to isolate the nation in which a false statement
or a securities transaction occurs,52 but false statements in one
48. E.g., Parrish, supra note 29, at 1456-60 (discussing the traditional approach under
which application of a statute based upon effects, but not conduct, is extraterritorial).
49. See, e.g., Colangelo, supra note 29, at 1021 (giving examples of cybercrime and child
sex tourism as transnational criminal conduct).
50. See, e.g., Case 89/85, Åhlström Osakeyhtiö v. Comm’n (Wood Pulp), 1988 E.C.R. 5193,
5243 (holding that price fixing by wood pulp producers outside the European Union violated
European Union competition law when the conspiracy was implemented by selling at the
illegally agreed prices in the European Union).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945)
(holding that a cartel of foreign producers of aluminum who agreed to limit production
violated U.S. antitrust law, even though the limit covered only production of aluminum
outside the United States, because less worldwide supply of aluminum would mean higher
aluminum prices in the United States).
52. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of
American Securities Law, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 207, 216-18 (1996) (explaining how
conduct in securities transactions often occurs in more than one country).
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nation can impact the prices at which securities are sold in other
nations.53
Deciding whether to apply the presumption against extraterritori-
ality in all these cases in which misconduct and its effect occurs
inside and outside the nation is difficult because the two simple
answers simply do not work. The problem with the “half-empty”
approach of finding extraterritoriality any time some arguably
relevant conduct or effect occurs outside the nation is fairly obvious.
If each nation’s courts apply a presumption against extraterritorial-
ity when any conduct or effect occurs in another nation, then no
nation will prosecute cross-border misconduct like the classic cross-
border shooting example in the all too common54 situation in which
legislatures neglect to specify the territorial reach of statutes
(which, of course, is why courts created the presumption).55 Not only
is this a poor result as a policy matter, but it is also difficult to
imagine that legislatures intended this result.56 On the other hand,
if courts follow the “half-full” approach and find no extraterritorial-
ity any time some arguably relevant conduct or effect occurs inside
the nation, then, in an increasingly interconnected world, it may be
too easy for imaginative plaintiffs to avoid the presumption against
extraterritoriality by pointing to some attenuated conduct or effect
that occurred within the nation. This problem appears to require a
“Goldilocks” solution.
53. See, e.g., Hannah L. Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions Under Federal Securities
Law: Managing Jurisdictional Conflict, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 14, 44-48 (2007)
(discussing the impact of fraudulent representations in the United States on prices in foreign
markets).
54. At least this will be the case in common law jurisdictions. E.g., Kenneth S. Gallant,
The Indeterminate Law of Jurisdiction, the Presumption Against Extraterritorial Application
of Statutes, and Uncertainty in U.S. Criminal Law, 27 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV.
L.J. 219, 224 (2014).
55. See, e.g., United States v. Pac. & Arctic Ry. & Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87, 98 (1913)
(pointing out that the logic of the defendants’ argument that the Sherman Act did not reach
price fixing involving a railroad between the United States and Canada because there was
conduct outside the United States would mean that neither the United States nor Canada
would prohibit the cross-border price fixing).
56. Indeed, after an English court held that neither nation could prosecute when a blow
was struck in one country and death ensued in another country, the English Parliament
passed legislation to overturn this rule. E.g., S.S. Lotus, (Fr. v. Turk), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A)
No. 10, at 65, 78 (Sept. 7) (Moore, J., dissenting).
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II. MORRISON AND THE STATUTORY FOCUS TEST
A. Application of U.S. Law to Transnational Securities Frauds       
    Pre-Morrison
In order to understand the test that the Supreme Court crafted
in Morrison for determining whether a claim involves extraterritori-
ality, it helps to review how the lower courts before Morrison
decided whether to apply the antifraud provision in U.S. securities
law to events beyond the country. It is ironic that the Supreme
Court in Morrison so criticized the lower courts for ignoring the
presumption against extraterritoriality, when the very essence of
the test developed by the lower courts for determining whether U.S.
law covered transnational securities frauds relied on jurisdiction
based upon territoriality, and specifically, whether some conduct or
effect occurred within the United States.
Application of U.S. securities laws to fraudulent transactions
outside the United States started in the 1960s. In Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook, the Second Circuit confronted a situation in which
directors of a Canadian corporation allegedly defrauded their
corporation by having it issue stock cheaply to other companies in
Canada.57 This diluted the value of stock previously issued by the
corporation, some of which traded on the American Stock Exchange,
and triggered a lawsuit by shareholders in the United States.58 The
shareholders asserted that the directors’ action violated section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act59 and Rule 10b-560 promulgat-
ed by the Securities Exchange Commission pursuant to section
10(b). The combination of this section and rule prohibits fraud in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security, and courts have
held that private parties injured by the violation have an implied
cause of action against the wrongdoer.61 Recognizing that the
purpose of the Securities Exchange Act encompasses protecting
57. 405 F.2d 200, 204-05 (2d Cir. 1968).
58. Id.
59. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
60. Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 205-06; see 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5 (2013).
61. E.g., Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 802 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
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investors trading on U.S. securities exchanges, the Second Circuit
held that section 10(b) applied based upon the domestic effect even
though the fraud occurred in Canada.62
A few years later, the Second Circuit confronted a situation in
Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell in which
officials of an English company convinced an American company to
purchase stock in the English company by misrepresentations that
took place in the United States and in England.63 The court again
held that section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 could apply—in this case
based upon the occurrence of conduct (some of the misrepresenta-
tions) in the United States.64 The combination of Schoenbaum and
Leasco created what became known as the conduct and effects test
to determine the reach of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 with respect
to securities fraud having a transnational dimension.65 Under this
test, conduct or effects in the United States might—depending upon
a balancing of factors66—subject a securities fraud to the reach of
the U.S. prohibition. The test spread from the Second Circuit to the
other circuits,67 albeit with some differences.68
The early cases developing the conduct and effects test seem not
to have provoked too much controversy. This changed over time. In
part, increasingly aggressive applications of the conduct and effects
test provoked reaction. This was particularly true with the use of
the test to reach so-called F-cubed cases—those in which the
plaintiffs were foreigners, the defendant was a foreign corporation,
and the purchases or sales of securities took place on foreign
securities markets.69 Under these circumstances, critics asked what
62. Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 205-06.
63. 468 F.2d 1326, 1330-33 (2d Cir. 1972).
64. Id. at 1333-39.
65. E.g., SEC v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 192-93 (2d Cir. 2003).
66. E.g., Eur. & Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas London, 147 F.3d
118, 129-31 (2d Cir. 1998) (balancing various factors in holding that section 10(b) did not
apply); Cont’l Grain (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pac. Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 414 (8th Cir. 1979)
(stating that the test looks at a number of factors with no one factor dispositive).
67. E.g., Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 667 (7th Cir. 1998); Grunenthal
GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 424-25 (9th Cir. 1983); Pac. Oilseeds Inc., 592 F.2d at 414; SEC
v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 115 (3d Cir. 1977).
68. E.g., Sternberg, 149 F.3d at 665 (“The predominant difference among the circuits, it
appears, is the degree to which the American-based conduct must be related causally to the
fraud and the resultant harm to justify the application of American securities law.”).
69. See, e.g., Daniel Kantor, Note, The Limits of Federal Jurisdiction and the F-cubed
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possible interest the United States had in applying its securities
fraud law to the plaintiffs’ claims, simply by virtue of the fact that
some of the conduct in creating or promulgating the false or
misleading statements took place in the United States.70
A second source of reaction arose out of cases in which application
of U.S. law highlighted policy tensions. In a case like Leasco, in
which a solitary defrauded investor sued the company that lied to
its representatives, no one other than the defendant was likely to
object to the application of U.S. securities laws. In large shareholder
class actions against prominent foreign corporations, however,
hostile reactions arose.71 This is not surprising because such class
actions have been controversial in the United States.72 Exacerbating
the problem are differences in substantive laws (such as the fraud
on the market presumption73) and procedural laws (with regard to
Case: Adjudicating Transnational Securities Disputes in Federal Courts, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 839, 841 (2010) (discussing F-cubed cases).
70. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Linda J. Silberman, Transnational Litigation and Global
Securities Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 465, 493-96 (2009) (arguing that including
purchasers on foreign stock markets in securities fraud class actions is unnecessary to protect
the interests of U.S. investors or the purposes of the Securities Exchange Act).
71. See, e.g., STAFF OF THE SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON THE CROSS-BORDER SCOPE OF
THE PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER SECTION 10(B) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF
1934, at 23-24 (2012) (quoting amicus briefs filed in Morrison by the British, French, and
Australian governments that criticized the United States for allowing class actions seeking
recovery for securities frauds in connection with trading shares on their markets).
72. E.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence
and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1534 (2006) (“The standard criticism from
the business community, the corporate bar, and some academics has long been that securities
class actions disproportionately assert frivolous claims and thereby reduce shareholder
welfare on average.”).
73. The fraud on the market presumption allows purchasers or sellers of securities in
well-developed markets to claim indirect reliance on false statements they may never have
heard based upon the theory that such statements impacted the price paid or received by the
investors. The United States Supreme Court has accepted this presumption. See Basic, Inc.
v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988). Other nations have rejected it. See Marco Ventoruzzo,
Like Moths to a Flame? International Securities Litigation After Morrison: Correcting the
Supreme Court’s “Transactional Test,” 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 405, 414 (2012).
2014] DETERMINING EXTRATERRITORIALITY 359
such matters as class actions and contingency fees74) governing such
actions in the United States versus the laws elsewhere.
A final source of reaction arose out of the objection that the
conduct and effects test lacked clear definition and had devolved
into ad hoc and unpredictable judicial decisions.75 This last com-
plaint loomed especially large in persuading the Supreme Court to
seek a simpler test in Morrison.
B. Morrison
Morrison was an F-cubed case: the plaintiffs were Australians
who purchased stock in an Australian banking company through
transactions on the Australian stock market.76 Events in Florida ex-
plain the presence of the case in the United States. The Australian
banking company, National Australia Bank, purchased a Florida
firm, which conducted a business servicing mortgages.77 The prin-
cipal assets of such a business are the contracts it has to service
mortgages. The value of these contracts, in turn, partially depends
on how long the mortgages covered by the contracts will run. The
executives of the Florida firm overestimated how long the mortgages
would run before homeowners refinanced their mortgages, thereby
significantly overestimating the value of the firm’s mortgage-
servicing contracts.78 Because the National Australia Bank bought
the Florida firm, this inflated value appeared on the financial
reports that the bank filed in Australia and in the United States.79
74. E.g., Debra Lyn Bassett, Implied “Consent” to Personal Jurisdiction in Transnational
Class Litigation, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 619, 625, 628 (2004) (describing systems in other
countries without U.S. style class actions); Ventoruzzo, supra note 73, at 412 (describing the
impact on securities fraud litigation of differences between the U.S. opt-out class actions and
the collective actions in other nations in which members must affirmatively opt into the class,
and contingency fees in the United States).
75. E.g., Choi & Silberman, supra note 70, at 467.
76. Which a wag might say makes Morrison an A-cubed or AAA case.
77. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 168-69 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d on other
grounds, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
78. See id. at 169.
79. Because the bank’s American Depository Receipts (ADRs) were listed for trading in
the United States, the bank had to meet U.S. securities law reporting requirements, including
disclosing financial statements. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Commission, Form 20-F,
available at http://perma.cc/A8RR-AJ72 (providing the form for registering ADRs listed on a
national stock exchange, which includes financial reporting requirements).
360 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:341
Eventually, as homeowners refinanced their mortgages faster than
the Florida firm’s executives predicted, National Australia Bank
was forced to write down the value of the contracts held by the
Florida firm, leading the bank’s stock price to tumble.80 This, in
turn, led parties who bought shares in the Australian bank to sue
in U.S. court alleging violations of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.81
They claimed that the executives of the Florida firm deliberately
exaggerated the expected life of the mortgages and the value of the
mortgage-servicing contracts.82
To the lower courts applying the conduct and effects test, the
issue was where the fraudulent conduct took place. The plaintiffs
argued it took place in Florida, where the executives overestimated
the expected life of the mortgages and the value of their contracts,
and also made some misleading public statements touting the
subsidiary’s prospects.83 The lower courts, however, viewed the
fraudulent conduct as occurring in Australia, where the bank
incorporated the overvaluations into the financial reports it made
public.84 As a result, the Southern District of New York dismissed
the case, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed
the dismissal.85




84. The notion was that the fraud concocted in Florida did not hurt the plaintiffs who
bought their stock in Australia until the bank repeated it in Australia, thus, it was not the
direct cause of the plaintiff ’s injury. Id. at 176. The parallel might be to one who loads the
rifle in one jurisdiction and fires it in another. Of course, if there was no fraud in Florida,
there would be nothing misleading for the bank to repeat in Australia. It might be easier to
deny a connection between the plaintiffs’ trades in Australia and the misleading statements
by the Florida subsidiary’s executives or the misleading filings by the bank in the United
States. Even here, however, a causal link probably exists because, with global communication,
someone presumably would have noticed the inconsistency if the bank’s U.S. filings or the
executives’ statements had not matched the bank’s Australian misstatements.
85. The District Court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, reflecting
the way in which the courts before Morrison had characterized the issue of whether section
10(b) reached actions outside the United States. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct.
2869, 2876 (2010). The Supreme Court’s opinion in Morrison characterized the matter as a
merits issue (whether section 10(b) prohibited the activity in question given where it took
place), rather than a subject matter jurisdiction question (whether the nature of the matter
was one that a federal court could hear), because federal courts have jurisdiction to hear cases
involving the federal securities laws. Id. at 2877. Contributing to the complexity in
terminology in this area is the use of the term “prescriptive jurisdiction” to refer to the power
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When the case reached the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs found
an even less hospitable reception. The Justices agreed the plaintiffs
should lose,86 but splintered in their reasoning. A concurring opin-
ion by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg agreed with the lower courts
that the case simply failed under the conduct and effects test.87 In
an opinion written by Justice Scalia, the majority took a broader ap-
proach to the problem. They rejected the entire conduct and effects
test.88 Instead, they ruled that section 10(b) did not apply unless the
plaintiffs purchased or sold securities in the United States.89
In creating this new rule, the majority proclaimed reliance on the
presumption against extraterritoriality. This required the majority
to reject arguments that various provisions in the Securities
Exchange Act that rebutted the presumption against extraterritori-
ality.90 More critically for purposes of the present discussion, the
majority opinion needed to respond to the arguments that the
presumption against extraterritoriality was irrelevant to the plain-
tiffs’ claim given the existence of fraudulent conduct in Florida, as
well as to the lower courts’ conduct and effects test since this test
required some misconduct or an effect therefrom in the United
States.91
of a nation to create law governing events beyond its borders. E.g., 3D RESTATEMENT OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 39, § 402.
86. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2874-75.
87. Id. at 2894 (Stevens, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 2878-81 (majority opinion).
89. See id. at 2883.
90. The majority dismissed the arguments that the presumption was rebutted by: (1) the
language of section 10(b), which triggered application of the section upon using a means of
interstate commerce (defined to include commerce between foreign nations and any state); (2)
the prefatory section of the Securities Exchange Act, mentioning that prices set on U.S.
securities exchanges are quoted in foreign countries; and (3) section 30(a) and (b), which
showed an intent for the Securities Exchange Act to reach transactions outside the United
States. See id. at 2881-83. The court relied on the precedent of ARAMCO in ignoring the so-
called jurisdictional language of section 10(b) as not to be taken seriously. The implication of
the language in the Act’s prefatory section on the reach of section 10(b) is obscure. But the
Court misunderstood section 30(a) and (b). See infra note 113.
91. The Court also dealt with an argument advanced by the Solicitor General, who
proposed certain qualifiers on when conduct in the United States would be sufficient to trigger
the statute and argued that applying the statute to situations in which such conduct exists
would help promote honest markets in the United States and prevent the United States from
becoming a Barbary Coast from which persons direct fraud at foreign markets. See Morrison,
130 S. Ct. at 2886.
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C. Morrison’s Approach to Identifying Extraterritoriality
1. Roads Not Taken
Before discussing the approach for determining extraterritoriality
adopted by the Court in Morrison, it is useful to point out the
approaches the Court did not adopt. Implicit in the Court’s rejection
of the lower courts’ conduct and effects test, and explicit in the
Court’s discussion of the plaintiffs’ contention that the case did not
involve extraterritoriality because of the conduct in the United
States, is a rejection of the “half-full” approach to determining
extraterritoriality under which any conduct or effect within the
United States renders the presumption irrelevant. Indeed, the
Court characterized the presumption against extraterritoriality
under such an approach as “a craven watchdog indeed if it retreated
to its kennel whenever some domestic activity is involved in the
case.”92 On the other hand, the Court clearly did not adopt the “half-
empty” approach, under which any conduct or effect outside the
United States triggers the presumption. Otherwise, the Court could
simply have pointed to the false financials published in Australia,
as well the plaintiffs’ stock purchases there, as triggering the
presumption without the need for further analysis regarding the
focus of the statute.93
Most interesting of all, however, in terms of approaches rejected,
is that the Court proclaimed such fealty to the presumption against
extraterritoriality at the same time the Court abandoned—without
the slightest acknowledgment—the traditionalist approach to
determining extraterritoriality. Going back at least to American
Banana, those favoring strong territorial limits on the reach of laws
looked to the location of the ostensibly wrongful conduct.94 This is
why the debate between those continuing to favor a strong presump-
tion against extraterritoriality and those finding territorial limits
too confining repeatedly returns to the legitimacy and wisdom of
92. Id. at 2884.
93. The Court could still have reached its ultimate result under which the location of sale
dictates the application of section 10(b) if the Court applied the presumption against
extraterritoriality based upon any conduct or effect outside the United States. It could simply
have found the presumption to be rebutted for sales occurring in the United States.
94. E.g., Parrish, supra note 29, at 1478-82 (arguing against the effects test).
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going beyond the location of the wrongful conduct and extending the
coverage of laws to reach conduct in another country that causes
effects in this one (the “effects test” or “objective territoriality”).95
Whatever else one can say about Morrison’s approach for
determining extraterritoriality for purposes of section 10(b) by the
location of the plaintiffs’ purchase or sale of securities, this test is
definitely not geared to where the wrongful conduct took place. In
Morrison, the plaintiffs accused the defendant of making false
statements in the United States and in Australia.96 As is commonly
the situation in securities fraud class actions,97 however, the
defendant was not selling stock to the plaintiffs. Instead, the
plaintiffs purchased stock in secondary trading on the stock market
from other shareholders (who apparently were innocent of any
wrongdoing) at a price impacted by the defendant’s misrepresenta-
tions.98 Hence, if one conceptualizes Morrison’s location of the
purchase or sale in terms of conduct and effects, the test looked to
the location of one effect (the purchase or sale at a price impacted by
fraud), rather than the location of the defendant’s wrongful conduct
(the fraudulent misrepresentation).99
It is not an accident that Morrison abandoned the traditional
location of the conduct approach, for the situation in Morrison
illustrates why the traditional approach can fail to satisfy anyone.
Morrison is a case in which the wrongful conduct did not occur in
just one nation—the misrepresentations occurred in both the United
95. Id.; see also Meyer, supra note 29, at 114-18 (describing different schools of thought
regarding extraterritoriality among legal scholars including those who would extend laws to
protect against undesirable effects in the United States and those who would favor limiting
laws to conduct in a nation’s territory and those who favor balancing interests).
96. See generally Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2875-76.
97. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 72, at 1556 (discussing securities fraud litigation against
corporations that are not issuing stock).
98. E-mail from George Conway, Att’y for Respondent in Morrison, to author (on file with
author).
99. See, e.g., William S. Dodge, Morrison’s Effects Test, 40 SW. U. L. REV. 687 (2011). It
would be spurious to say that Morrison was still looking at the location of conduct (the sale).
This either misrepresents what happened in Morrison—erroneously assuming, as in the
typical consumer fraud, that the person who made the misrepresentation also made the sale
so that one can call either a portion of the wrongful conduct—or uses the idea of conduct to
encompass the effects of the wrongful conduct so long as those effects constitute actions. The
problem with this sleight of hand is that it would seem to say that the nation in which the
funeral occurs can rely on the notion of regulating conduct in order to apply its law to a fatal
shooting by a person across the border.
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States and Australia. This is not an aberration, for such multi-
jurisdiction misconduct has long existed in other securities fraud
cases.100 Nor is the problem confined to securities fraud. Indeed, any
sort of international conspiracy—whether an anticompetitive cartel
or a terrorist ring—will involve illegal conduct straddling countries.
For example, if a group of producers from different nations agree on
fixing prices, the potentially illegal conduct occurs not only in the
nation(s) in which persons from the companies meet to form their
agreement, but presumably in every nation in which any producer
carries out the agreement when setting its prices. This is why the
initial inroads on American Banana’s territorialism in the antitrust
area—both in the United States101 and in Europe102—involved not
an immediate jump to the effects test, but rather situations in which
the relevant conduct occurred both within and outside the nation.
The fact that wrongful conduct often straddles borders punctures
the hope that focusing on the location of the conduct will avoid the
need for tough choices in determining when cases involve extraterri-
toriality. Using the facts in Morrison as an example, if both the
United States and Australia had interpreted their securities fraud
prohibitions not to apply unless all the wrongful conduct occurred
either in the United States or in Australia, then neither nation’s
laws might have prohibited the fraud in Morrison. If both the
United States and Australia had ignored the presumption because
some conduct occurred in each nation, then the overlap in the
application of laws would have continued.103
100. E.g., Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1331 (2d Cir.
1972) (involving misrepresentations which took place in meetings in the United States and
England and in calls and mailings from England to the United States); see Kauthar SDN BHD
v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 665 (7th Cir. 1998) (“The predominant difference among the
circuits, it appears, is the degree to which the American-based conduct must be related
causally to the fraud and the resultant harm to justify the application of American securities
law.”).
101. E.g., Kramer, supra note 29, at 751-52 (pointing out that prior to the Supreme Court’s
1993 decision in Hartford Fire Insurance, the Supreme Court had only applied the Sherman
Act to conduct outside the United States in cases in which some of the anticompetitive
conduct also occurred inside the United States).
102. See, e.g., case 89185, Åhlström Osakeyhtiö v. Comm’n (Wood Pulp), 1988 E.C.R. 5193,
5243 (holding that price fixing by wood pulp producers violated European Community law
when the conspiracy was implemented in the European Community by selling at the illegally
agreed prices).
103. One could try to limit the reach of the relevant conduct by attempting to distinguish
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Moreover, Morrison illustrated that looking to the location of the
wrongful conduct can still lead to applying a nation’s law to situ-
ations in which it may both offend other nations and, at the same
time, fail to advance the goals of the legislation, thereby triggering
rationales underlying the presumption against extraterritoriality.104
It was the occurrence of fraudulent conduct in the United States, as
in Morrison, that provided the basis for the F-cubed cases of class
actions by foreign investors against foreign corporations based upon
foreign transactions.105 And it was the F-cubed cases that provoked
the most controversy both from those who saw little point in
expending U.S. judicial resources on litigation that did not advance
between mere preparation and the actual wrongful act, or between those actions directly
versus indirectly causing the harm. This is returning, however, to the distinctions drawn
under the Second Circuit’s conduct and effects test. E.g., Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC, 54 F.3d
118, 121-22 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying the conduct and effects test by looking at whether the
conduct in the United States was more than merely preparatory and whether it directly
versus indirectly caused the harm to investors). As discussed earlier, the Second Circuit’s use
of such distinctions had provoked criticism as hard to apply. See supra note 75 and
accompanying text. At the other end, one could attempt to limit the range of the relevant
effects by distinguishing between those which are direct or intended versus those which are
indirect or unintended, or by only considering those which are necessary elements of the
prohibited conduct, such as death in the case of murder. E.g., R.Y. Jennings, Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction and the United States Antitrust Laws, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 146, 159-60 (1957)
(distinguishing applying a statute based upon effects within a nation that are necessary
elements of the crime, such as death in the case of murder, from applying a statute based
upon other effects). Distinguishing direct or intended from indirect or unintended effects still
confronts the criticism of supplying difficult lines to apply. Limiting effects only to those which
are necessary elements may not prevent expansive application of U.S. law under the effects
test in antitrust because anticompetitive impact can be part of establishing that an agreement
constitutes an illegal restraint of trade under the rule of reason. E.g., Chi. Bd. of Trade v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (“[In determining whether an agreement violates the
Sherman Act,] the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which
the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature
of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable.”). Yet, it is with the effects test in antitrust
that there has been considerable controversy. E.g., Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the
Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 24 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1, 32-33 (1993) (discussing
foreign government protests and retaliation against application of U.S. antitrust law based
upon the effects test).
104. E.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (ARAMCO ), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (explaining
that the presumption against extraterritoriality “serves to protect against unintended clashes
between our laws and those of other nations which could result in international discord” and
reflects the notion that, in legislating, Congress “is primarily concerned with domestic
conditions”).
105. E.g., Buxbaum, supra note 53, at 24.
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any U.S. interests,106 and from foreign governments who saw such
cases as interfering with their securities regulation.107
2. The Statutory Focus Test
Turning from what the Court rejected to what it adopted, Mor-
rison invoked a test of statutory “focus” in order to resolve when a
claim involves extraterritoriality: if the event which is the focus of
the statute occurs in this country, there is no extraterritoriality; if
the event which is the focus of the statute occurs abroad, there is. In
applying this test to the situation before it, the Court in Morrison
decided that the focus of section 10(b)’s prohibition of fraud in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities is the purchase or
sale.108 Hence, section 10(b) reaches fraud in connection with pur-
chases or sales of securities in the United States, but, following the
presumption against extraterritoriality, the court presumed
Congress did not intend section 10(b) to reach fraud in connection
with purchases or sales of securities outside the United States—as
in the stock purchases by the Morrison plaintiffs in Australia.109
This, however, raises the question of how the Court should decide
what the focus of the statute is; in other words, if statutory focus
provides the test for determining extraterritoriality, what is the test
for determining statutory focus? Unfortunately, the Court in
Morrison provided no general standards, but instead simply made
a determination based on the statute before it. Hence, we must
examine how the Court in Morrison decided that the focus of section
10(b)’s prohibition of fraud in connection with the purchase or sale
of securities is the purchase or sale rather than the fraud,110 and
from this example deduce what it means to be the focus of the
statute for purposes of determining extraterritoriality.
106. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 71; see also Buxbaum, supra note 53, at 61-64 (arguing in 2007 that F-
cubed class actions would increasingly produce conflict with other nations).
108. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884 (2010).
109. Id. at 2877-78.
110. See id. at 2884.
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a. Morrison’s Circular Method for Identifying the Statutory
Focus
Rather than applying a general test for determining a statute’s
focus, the opinion of the Court in Morrison made a hodgepodge of
arguments in support of its specific conclusion that the focus of
section 10(b) is the purchase or sale. These ranged from the obvious,
but question-begging, point that section 10(b) only penalizes fraud
in connection with the purchase or sale of a security111 to the
argument that the statute’s prologue (not to mention title) makes it
clear that Congress intended the Securities Exchange Act to
regulate national (U.S.) securities exchanges;112 to an invocation of
section 30(a) and (b) of the Securities Exchange Act (which limit the
Act’s regulation of brokers and dealers outside the United States);113
111. See id. at 2881-84. Although it is true that section 10(b) does not penalize fraud that
is not in connection with the purchase or sale of a security, it also does not deal with the
purchase or sale of a security without fraud. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15
U.S.C. § 78j-2 (2012). This does not tell us as between the fraud and the purchase or sale,
which is the dog and which is the tail (or, to use the Court’s language, which is the focus).
112. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884. Section 10(b), however, is expressly not limited to
exchange-traded securities, as Congress made painfully clear by stating that the section
covers fraud in connection with “the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national
securities exchange or any security not so registered.” 15 U.S.C. § 78j. The Court was grasping
at straws in its rejoinder, which argued that Congress must have meant domestic transactions
when referring in section 10(b) to the purchase or sale of any security not registered on a
national securities exchange, because otherwise it would have been simpler for the section
just to say the purchase or sale of any security. The obvious problem with this argument is
that it would have been simpler for Congress to say the purchase or sale of any security in the
United States if the reason Congress used this verbose language was to indicate that it only
wanted to cover domestic transactions. A more likely rationale for what is obviously a long-
winded way of saying the purchase or sale of any security is to make it clear that Congress
meant section 10(b) to reach any security whether registered or not, which is different from
many other provisions of the Securities Exchange Act. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78l (registration
requirement for companies listing shares on a national securities exchange); 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1
(proxy solicitation rules for companies with shares listed on a national securities exchange);
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (dealing with short swing trades by insiders of companies with shares
listed on a national securities exchange).
113. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2882-83. Section 30(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(a), prohibits a broker
or dealer from effecting transactions in securities of U.S. companies on foreign securities
exchanges in violation of regulations promulgated by the SEC to prevent evasion of the
Securities Exchange Act. Section 30(b) provides that the Securities Exchange Act does “not
apply to any person insofar as he transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction
of the United States,” unless the person does so in violation of the SEC regulations referred
to in section 30(a). Id. § 78dd(b). At first glance, these provisions seem to support Morrison’s
result, and indeed, one may wonder why it was even necessary for the Court to invoke the
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to the SEC’s interpretation of the reach of the 1933 Securities Act’s
prohibition on selling unregistered securities (generally not to reach
presumption against extraterritoriality instead of simply citing section 30(b) for the prop-
osition that the Securities Exchange Act does not apply to transactions outside the United
States unless the SEC has promulgated a regulation specifically calling for such application.
A more careful reading of section 30(b) reveals that the section does not prevent provisions
of the Securities Exchange Act from applying to transactions outside the United States;
rather, it precludes provisions of the Act from applying to “any person insofar as he transacts
a business in securities” outside the United States. Id.
In Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, the Second Circuit consulted the definitions section of the
Securities Exchange Act—always a good idea—and concluded that section 30(b)’s reference
to a person who “transacts a business in securities” refers to brokers, dealers, and banks. 405
F.2d 200, 207-08 (2d Cir. 1968). Specifically, section 3(4) of the Securities Exchange Act
defines a broker as “any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities
for the account of others.” 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A). Section 3(5) defines a dealer as “any person
engaged in the business of buying and selling securities ... for such person’s own account.” Id.
§ 78c(a)(5)(A). Critically, section 3(5) excludes from the definition of a dealer “a person that
buys or sells securities ... for such person’s own account ... but not as a part of a regular
business.” Id. § 78c(a)(5)(B). This distinction between persons who buy and sell securities for
their own account as part of a business (dealers) and persons who buy and sell securities for
their own account, but not as part of a regular business, (not dealers) makes it clear that the
person who “transacts a business in securities” language in section 30(b) does not encompass
ordinary investors who purchase or sell a security, such as the plaintiffs in Morrison. Id. §
78dd(b). Nor, of course, is a non-trading corporation, such as National Australia Bank, which
files misleading financial reports, a person who transacts a business in securities. Hence,
section 30(b) does not show an intention to place all overseas purchases and sales of securities
beyond the reach of the Securities Exchange Act and thus does not support the court’s focus
argument.
Both the definition of broker and the definition of dealer in section 3 expressly exclude
banks even when banks engage in the business of making various securities transactions that
would otherwise bring them within the definition of a broker or dealer. Id. §§ 78c(a)(4)-(5).
Based upon this, Schoenbaum concluded that the reason section 30(b) used the person who
“transacts a business in securities” language instead of just saying brokers and dealers was
to include banks in the exemption from coverage under the Act when banks conduct securities
operations outside the United States. Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 206-08. Interpreting section
30(b) to refer to brokers, dealers, and banks explains section 30(a). Section 30(b) creates an
exemption to the Act’s regulation of brokers, dealers, and banks when they conduct securities
operations outside the United States. Section 30(a), in turn, authorizes the SEC to issue
regulations creating exceptions to the exemption if the SEC determines that brokers or
dealers are exploiting the exemption in section 30(b) to evade the Act when conducting
overseas trading in securities issued by U.S. companies. Hence, the fact that section 30(a)
authorizes the SEC to promulgate regulations creating liability for overseas trading by
brokers and dealers does not show that Congress believed that all overseas trading was
otherwise beyond the reach of the Securities Exchange Act. Indeed, had Congress believed
that all overseas trading was beyond the reach of the Securities Exchange Act, it would not
have felt the need to exclude the overseas activities of brokers, dealers, and banks in section
30(b). Hence, this section actually rebuts the Court’s view that Congress did not intend the
Act to apply to overseas sales.
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sales outside the United States);114 and finally to complaints in
various amicus briefs filed by foreign governments and business
groups about the interference with foreign securities regulation
created by extending section 10(b) to transactions abroad.115 As
discussed in the footnotes above, these arguments ignored or
misconstrued statutory language, administrative construction, or
even common sense—which should be somewhat embarrassing to a
Supreme Court Justice who recently coauthored a book advocating
a textual approach to reading statutes.116 This, however, is water
under the bridge. The critical point for the future is what these
arguments tell us about what the Court means when it refers to the
focus of the statute for purposes of determining if a situation
involves extraterritoriality. 
None of these arguments really show that the sale is the focus of
section 10(b) in the sense that it is somehow of greater concern to
Congress than is the fraud (instead of the fraud being of greater
114. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2885. The Court incorrectly asserted that the SEC limited
the registration requirement only to sales in the United States—which is a misleading over-
simplification of both the history and actual requirements of the SEC’s interpretation of the
registration requirement. See, e.g., Don Berger, Offshore Distribution of Securities: The Impact
of Regulation S, 3 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 575, 577-82 (1990) (discussing SEC interpretations, prior
to Regulation S, of the application of the Securities Act registration requirement to overseas
transactions, which viewed the registration requirement as applying to some sales to
Americans overseas; and detailing the requirements of Regulation S, which excludes sales of
securities outside the United States from the Securities Act registration requirement
depending upon elaborate tests to address possible impacts of foreign offerings on U.S.
markets). Moreover, the fact that the intended application of a statute prohibiting the
unregistered sale of securities might depend upon where the sale takes place does not tell us
that the application of a statute prohibiting fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities depends upon where the purchase or sale, as opposed to the fraud, occurred.
115. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2885-86. This seems to contradict other portions of the
Court’s opinion in which it says that comity and avoiding conflicts with other nations’ laws
was not the issue; rather the issue was Congress’s intent. See id. at 2877-78. The Court tried
to avoid the contradiction by recasting the significance of these foreign relations concerns into
an argument that Congress would have addressed such conflicts had it intended the Securities
Exchange Act to reach transactions abroad—as if Congress always anticipates and addresses
all the issues that arise with domestic applications of its legislation. See id. The Court’s
argument was especially problematic insofar as courts have created the private right of action
for violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)(5). See id. at 2894 (Stevens, J., concurring); see
also supra note 61 and accompanying text. This, of course, makes it rather difficult for
Congress to have anticipated how to reconcile with foreign laws the ground rules for such a
later judicially created action.
116. See generally ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRE-
TATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012). 
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concern than is the sale). As the Court actually applied the test, the
sale is the so-called focus of section 10(b) simply because it is the
conduct which, according to the Court, Congress intended must
occur in the United States in order to trigger the statute.117 More-
over, the Court determined that this was Congress’s intent using
(albeit poorly) the normal tools of statutory construction, relying on
the statute’s language (the limitation of overseas coverage in section
30(a) and (b) argument), its purpose (the intent to regulate U.S.
securities exchanges argument), and administrative interpretation
(the SEC interpretation of the territorial reach of the 1933 Securi-
ties Act argument), as well as policy considerations (the clash with
foreign regimes argument).118 In other words, these arguments were,
for the most part, simply normal statutory construction arguments
trying to show that Congress did not intend to regulate overseas
sales.
At first glance, one may be tempted to say that this is a sensible
approach to what is, after all, an issue of statutory interpretation.
The problem, however, is that if the Court can conclude that
Congress did not intend to regulate overseas sales based upon
statutory language, overall purpose, administrative construction,
policy, or the like, what is the point of invoking the presumption
against extraterritoriality? Put differently, there is not much utility
in a test for determining extraterritoriality if to apply the test the
Court must decide whether Congress intended the statute to reach
the situation facing the Court. After all, the purpose for determining
if the situation before the Court involves extraterritoriality is so
that the Court can invoke the presumption against extraterritorial-
ity as a means to decide what Congress intended. The end result is
that the Morrison Court created a test that is entirely circular, since
it requires the Court to determine whether Congress intended the
statute to reach the situation in order to invoke the presumption to
determine whether Congress intended the statute to reach the
situation.
117. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877-78, 2884.
118. See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
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b. The Statutory Focus Test in Other Supreme Court                
            Opinions
Perhaps the problem with the statutory focus test for determining
extraterritoriality is not the test itself, but simply the way in which
the Morrison Court went about identifying the statutory focus;
specifically, the Court succumbed to the understandable temptation
of asking whether provisions in the securities statutes showed
Congress intended to penalize fraud in connection with overseas
sales and forgot that the Court was trying to determine whether to
trigger a presumption that would answer this question. Before
concluding that the problem is simply poor execution, however, we
should examine whether other Supreme Court opinions have done
any better with the test.
The Court in Morrison claimed that the statutory focus test
came from the Court’s seminal ARAMCO decision.119 It is true that
ARAMCO refers to a statutory “focus”; but this was in responding
to the plaintiff’s effort to rebut the presumption against extraterri-
toriality when the Court said that the provisions of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act showed a domestic focus.120 ARAMCO
was not referring to the statutory “focus” as a test for determining
which conduct or effects dictated whether a situation involved
extraterritoriality. This is because the plaintiff in ARAMCO did not
argue that some conduct or effect in the United States meant that
his claim was not extraterritorial. The Morrison Court pretended
otherwise when it stated that the plaintiff in ARAMCO was an
American and was hired in the United States.121 The plaintiff’s
nationality, however, has nothing to do with territoriality as a basis
for applying a nation’s law;122 moreover, the plaintiff in ARAMCO
did not claim that the location of his hiring was relevant, presum-
ably because the hiring occurred five years before the discriminatory
firing in Saudi Arabia.123 Indeed, the Court in ARAMCO did not say
what the test would be under the Equal Employment Opportunity
119. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2882-83.
120. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (ARAMCO), 499 U.S. 244, 254 (1991).
121. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2874.
122. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
123. ARAMCO, 499 U.S. at 247.
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Act for handling situations in which potentially relevant conduct
occurred both in the United States and abroad—as, for instance, if
the defendant did not hire individuals in the United States who the
defendant knew could not work in Saudi Arabia because of religious
discrimination there, or if the defendant hired such individuals in
the United States knowing they would be fired the moment they
arrived in Saudi Arabia.124 Nor did the Court in ARAMCO say what
the result would be if there were discriminatory effects in the
United States from discriminatory conduct overseas—as, for in-
stance, if experience working in Saudi Arabia played a critical role
in advancement prospects in corporate headquarters in the United
States.
In the recent Kiobel decision, some of the Justices toyed with the
question of determining extraterritoriality for claims under the
Alien Tort Statute (ATS), even though no one suggested the
situation in Kiobel involved any relevant conduct or effect in the
United States. Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion closed with the
admonition that “even where the claims touch and concern the
territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient force
to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.”125
If Roberts intended “sufficient force” either to clarify or to substitute
for Morrison’s statutory focus test, it is difficult to see how this
improves the situation. Moreover, it is unclear how many Justices
in the fractured opinions in Kiobel would support determining
extraterritoriality by testing whether “the claims touch and con-
cern the territory of the United States ... with sufficient force.”126
Indeed, Justices Alito and Thomas concurred separately with an
effort to apply the statutory focus test to the ATS.127
Unfortunately, the Alito and Thomas concurrence simply demon-
strated further the unworkable nature of the statutory focus test.
Their concurring opinion equated the statutory focus of the ATS
124. See, e.g., Souryal v. Torres Advanced Enter. Solutions, LLC, 847 F. Supp. 2d 835, 839-
40 (E.D. Va. 2012) (noting that ARAMCO did not address whether the Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993 applied when the defendant’s relevant decision was made in the United
States but involved a workplace overseas).
125. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) (citing Morrison,
130 S. Ct. at 2883-88).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1669-70.
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with the sort of conduct that the Supreme Court, in its earlier Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain opinion,128 concluded Congress meant to reach
in the ATS—specifically, conduct “sufficient to violate an interna-
tional law norm that satisfies Sosa’s requirements of definiteness
and acceptance among civilized nations.”129 But this simply treated
the statutory focus as equaling what the statute prohibits.130 To
return to our examples of securities fraud and shootings, section
10(b) prohibits fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a
security.131 If one were to say, however, that the focus of section
10(b) is fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a security,
this would simply beg the question of whether there is extraterrito-
riality in a situation in which the fraudulent misrepresentation
occurs inside the United States and the resulting sale occurs outside
the nation, or visa versa. This is why the Court in Morrison had to
decide that the focus of section 10(b) was the sale not the fraud.132
Similarly, to say that the focus of a statute prohibiting murder is an
intentional and unjustified action causing death (in other words, the
definition of murder133) begs the question of whether there is
extraterritoriality when a shooter stands in one nation and his
victim is across the border. Applied to the ATS, the question would
be what to do if (as in a typical movie plot) henchmen carried out
torture abroad under orders from evil masterminds at corporate
headquarters in the United States. Alito and Thomas’s definition of
focus really does not answer whether this involves extraterritorial-
ity. Presumably, Alito and Thomas did not mean to suggest that
extraterritoriality exists unless all the relevant conduct and effects
(or all the elements of the prohibited act) occur in the United States.
This would be inconsistent with Morrison’s place of sale test and
would create the problems discussed earlier with this “half-empty”
approach to defining extraterritoriality.134
128. 542 U.S. 692, 731-33 (2004).
129. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1670.
130. Or with the ATS, equating focus with the acts for which the statute provides a remedy.
131. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-2 (2012).
132. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884 (2010).
133. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 498-99 (6th ed. 2012).
134. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
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c. Lower Courts and the Statutory Focus Test: Herein of RICO
After Morrison, lower federal courts have struggled with apply-
ing the statutory focus test to other laws: particularly the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO).135 RICO prohibits
conducting the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activities.136 The government and private plaintiffs
have attempted to apply RICO to events occurring both inside and
outside the United States in situations ranging from Chinese
nationals accused of illegal money transfers and immigration fraud
in the United States as part of their scheme to steal money from the
Bank of China,137 to a primarily foreign group accused of engaging
in money laundering and other acts in the United States in
furtherance of a conspiracy to take over the Russian oil industry.138
Prior to Morrison, lower federal courts borrowed the conduct and
effects test from the securities fraud cases as an approach to deal
with these situations under RICO.139 Recognizing that Morrison
invalidated this approach, lower federal courts turned to asking
135. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2012). Beyond RICO, a federal district court, in SIPC v.
Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities Inc., applied the statutory focus test to determine
whether the Bankruptcy Code provision (section 550), which enables the bankruptcy trustee
to set aside preferential pre-bankruptcy transfers, applied to transfers outside the United
States. 513 B.R. 222, 225 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014). In this case, the trustee sought return of
funds transferred from Bernie Madoff ’s infamous ponzi scheme fund in the United States to
so-called foreign feeder funds and, in turn, transferred from the foreign feeder funds on their
liquidation to their investors overseas. The court held that the focus of the bankruptcy code
provision recapturing preferential transfers was the transfer, rather than the administration
of the bankruptcy estate (or, as argued by the Trustee administering the Madoff fund under
the Securities Investors Protection Act, the regulation of brokers). Id. at 226. While at first
glance the court’s result seems intuitively correct, Morrison’s logic might have suggested a
different conclusion: just as fraud does not violate Rule 10b-5 without the sale, a transfer does
not become voidable without the bankruptcy. In fact, the district court’s decision appears to
display the same sort of circularity as Morrison. The court relied on pre-Morrison decisions,
which, without applying the focus test, had held that the bankruptcy statute did not reach
overseas transfers, and the court was highly concerned about avoiding conflicts with other
nations’ laws. Id. at 229-31. Although precedent and policy arguments suggesting that a
statute should not apply to overseas events are sensible tools in interpreting a statute’s reach,
neither actually goes to whether the event occurring overseas was the statute’s focus.
136. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
137. United States v. Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d 965, 974, 979 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding RICO
applied). 
138. Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 631 F.3d 29, 32-33 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding
RICO did not apply).
139. See, e.g., Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., 379 F.3d 654, 663 (9th Cir. 2004).
2014] DETERMINING EXTRATERRITORIALITY 375
whether the events constituting the statutory focus of RICO
occurred in the United States, which, in turn, forced the courts to
question RICO’s statutory focus.140 Much as Morrison had to ask
whether the focus of the prohibition on securities fraud is the fraud
or the purchase or sale of securities, lower federal courts have had
to ask whether the focus of RICO’s prohibition on conducting the
affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activities
is the enterprise or the pattern of racketeering activities.
Not surprisingly, lower federal courts have split between those
finding RICO’s focus is the enterprise,141 those finding RICO’s focus
is the pattern of racketeering activities,142 and at least one court
seemingly suggesting it could be either.143 Interestingly, with rare
exception,144 neither side has followed Morrison’s approach to
determining the statutory focus by asking which events Congress
intended must occur in the United States and working backwards
to treat that as the statutory focus. This is both good and bad. On
the positive side, these courts have avoided the circularity of
Morrison’s approach. The downside, however, is to create an ab-
stract exercise divorced from considerations of congressional intent
or, indeed, from any particular reason for presuming the statute
should not apply to the event in question when it occurs outside the
nation.
Lower federal courts have invoked a number of rationales when
holding that the statutory focus of RICO is on the enterprise. The
first is that RICO does not prohibit racketeering activities, or even
a pattern of racketeering activities; rather, it prohibits conducting
140. E.g., In re Le-Nature’s, Inc., No. 9-1445, 2011 WL 2112533, at *2 n.5 (W.D. Pa. May
26, 2011).
141. E.g., Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd. v. Seamaster Logistics, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 933, 938-
40 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Sorota v. Sosa, 842 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1350 (S.D. Fla. 2012); European
Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 2011 WL 843957, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2011); In re Toyota
Motor Corp., 785 F. Supp. 2d 883, 914 (C.D. Cal. 2011); Cedeno v. Intech Group, Inc., 733 F.
Supp. 2d 471, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
142. E.g., Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d at 977-78; Hourani v. Mirtchev, 943 F. Supp. 2d 159, 166
(D.D.C. 2013); Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 871 F. Supp. 2d 229, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); CGC
Holding Co. v. Hutchens, 824 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1209 (D. Colo. 2011).
143. In re Le-Nature’s, Inc., 2011 WL 2112533, at *3 n.7.
144. See Donziger, 871 F. Supp. 2d at 242 (noting, using the example of Sicilian Mafia
activities in the United States, that foreign enterprises have been at the heart of precisely the
sort of activities committed in the United States that Congress enacted RICO to eradicate, in
rejecting the enterprise as the focus of RICO).
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the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activities.145 This parallels Morrison’s argument that section 10(b)
does not prohibit fraud; it prohibits fraud in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security.146 As such, this rationale suffers the
same logical fallacy: although RICO does not prohibit a pattern of
racketeering activities when this pattern does not involve the
conduct of an enterprise, it also does not prohibit conducting the
affairs of an enterprise unless done through a pattern of racketeer-
ing activities. Hence, this does not really tell us which is the focus.
The same problem exists in the argument that RICO’s name (which
includes the term “organization”) and Congress’s concerns with
illegal activities by enterprises show that the enterprise is the focus
of RICO. The first word in RICO’s title is “racketeer,” not enterprise,
and Congress was concerned, in enacting RICO, with racketeering
(not bad management) by enterprises. Nor is this problem avoided
by those opinions147 that note that other statutes already prohibit
the activities (such as securities fraud) defined as racketeering
activities under RICO, and from this argue that the enterprise must
be RICO’s statutory focus. Conducting the affairs of the enterprise
is not the only added element distinguishing RICO violations from
the individual acts of racketeering in violation of other statutes;
there must also be a pattern of racketeering activities, which is not
a required element under the statutes prohibiting the individual
acts defined as racketeering activities under RICO.148
On the other side, the lower federal courts holding that the
pattern of racketeering activities is the statutory focus of RICO have
not done much better. They have based their holdings on ipsi
145. E.g., Sorota, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 1350; RJR Nabisco, Inc., 2011 WL 843957, at *4.
146. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884 (2010).
147. See Sorota, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 1350; RJR Nabisco, 2011 WL 843957, at *4.
148. This problem is not unique to RICO, but would confound efforts to equate the
statutory focus with the additional element distinguishing the statute at issue from lesser
crimes also committed. For example, since death distinguishes murder from criminal battery,
see Dressler, supra note 133, at 498, one may argue that death is the focus of a statute
prohibiting murder, and only the nation in which the victim actually dies can prosecute for
murder without extraterritoriality. Yet, malice aforethought distinguishes murder from
manslaughter, id., suggesting that specific intent is the focus of the statute against murder,
and that only the nation in which the defendant formed the intent can prosecute without
acting extraterritorially.
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dixit,149 invoked RICO’s language and purpose to show the statute’s
concern with racketeering activities (while ignoring the enterprise
language, just like the enterprise focus cases invoked language
and purpose about enterprises while ignoring the racketeering
language),150 or have pointed to potentially poor results and
administrative inconvenience presented by the difficulties of
locating the enterprise151 (which has nothing to do with the statute’s
focus). Hence, perhaps the ultimate lesson from the experience of
lower federal courts in trying to figure out the focus of RICO is
found in the lament by one district court:
Reflexive reference to the term “focus” is unhelpful, as a statute
could be described as concentrated on the activities it
criminalizes—here, racketeering activities—or on the entity or
person it seeks to protect, or on a blend of both, and all three
options may be accurate depending on context.152
III. DETERMINING EXTRATERRITORIALITY BY THE REASONS BEHIND
THE PRESUMPTION
A better approach for determining whether a claim involves
extraterritoriality might start by asking what justifies the presump-
tion against extraterritoriality. Then, one can determine whether
the presumption applies based upon whether the situation triggers
the rationale(s) behind the presumption. Although scholars have
suggested at least a half dozen reasons for the presumption,153
149. CGC Holding Co. v. Hutchens, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 1193, 1209 (D. Colo. 2011).
150. E.g., United States v. Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d 965, 978 (9th Cir. 2013).
151. Id. at 976. On the other hand, locating the pattern of racketeering activities raises its
own difficulties. For example, if some of the racketeering activities involve events both inside
and outside the United States, a court might need to identify the “focus” of various statutes
prohibiting the predicate acts defined by RICO to constitute racketeering activities in order
to determine which events are the relevant ones as far as deciding if the pattern of rack-
eteering activities occurred in the United States. See European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc.,
2014 WL 1613878, at *4 (2d Cir. Apr. 23, 2014) (holding that RICO can apply
extraterritorially if the specific statute prohibiting the relevant predicate act involved in the
case applies extraterritorially).
152. In re Le-Nature’s, Inc., 2011 WL 2112533, at *2 n.3 (W.D. Pa. May 26, 2011).
153. E.g., Dodge, supra note 27, at 112-13 (identifying six ostensible purposes asserted on
behalf of the presumption against extraterritoriality: (1) avoiding violation of international
law; (2) promoting consistency with a territorial view in choice of law; (3) avoiding conflicts
with foreign laws; (4) reflecting Congressional concern with domestic rather than foreign
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examining Supreme Court opinions reduces this number to
essentially three: (1) the observational rationale that the Court has
observed that Congress, whether based upon tradition or for
whatever reason, intends most statutes to apply within only the
United States, and so, in the absence of evidence of contrary intent
one can assume that Congress intends any given statute to apply
only within the United States; (2) the legislative purpose rationale
that Congress does not care about what goes on outside the United
States and therefore does not intend statutes to address what goes
on outside the United States; and (3) the international relations
rationale that applying U.S. law to events outside the United States
can upset other countries, which is a risk courts should interpret
statutes to avoid absent evidence that Congress really wants to take
this risk. Although all three of these rationales can justify invoking
the presumption against extraterritoriality in the easy cases in
which no conduct or effect occurs within the United States, it turns
out that only the third rationale can provide any sort of useful
guideline for determining whether to invoke the presumption in the
situation in which some conduct or effect occurs inside and some
outside the United States.
A. The Observational Rationale
In Morrison, the Court explained that the presumption against
extraterritoriality “rests on the perception that Congress ordinarily
legislates with respect to domestic, not foreign matters.”154 One
interpretation of this phrase is what I will label the observational
rationale for the presumption—the Court has observed that
Congress does not intend most statutes to apply extraterritorially
and so, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, one would assume
that any given statute does not apply extraterritorially. Of course,
this raises a question as to how the Court knew that Congress does
not intend most statutes to apply extraterritorially. If, in fact,
statutes are generally silent on their territorial reach, then the
Court might have engaged in a circular exercise in which it used the
conditions; (5) keeping courts out of matters impacting foreign affairs; and (6) providing a rule
against which Congress can legislate).
154. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010). 
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presumption in order to make the observation that justifies the
presumption.155 If statutes sometimes speak to their territorial
reach,156 then this creates an interesting question as to what this
should tell us about the meaning of statutes which are silent on the
topic.157
In any event, the problem with this observational rationale is that
it does not tell us how much territorial connection avoids the
presumption. Specifically, the observational rationale tells us that
Congress ordinarily does not intend to apply the various non-
territorial principles158 in establishing the reach of its legislation.
Accordingly, a court would logically demand evidence in the
language or purpose of the statute before concluding that the
statute applies in a situation in which there is no territorial
connection at all to the United States. Once we pass this minimal
threshold, however, the observational rationale cannot tell us
whether a given situation should trigger the presumption against
extraterritoriality without some extensive observations about what
Congress normally demands in terms of a territorial connection in
order for its legislation to apply. Given the common silence of
statutes,159 the uncertain implications of those statutes that speak
to the topic regarding the meaning of those that do not,160 and the
155. If territoriality is part of the legal tradition in a country, there is still a certain degree
of circularity because legal tradition reinforces itself; but at least the Court would not be using
a judicially created presumption to establish the basis for the very presumption. One might
argue that this circularity, in fact, is the whole point of the exercise in that a presumption
known to Congress provides background allowing Congress to legislate differently if Congress
does not wish the presumption to apply. E.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 277 (1994) (explaining this function of rules of interpretation, but concluding
that the presumption against extraterritoriality does not meet the criteria for a suitable
background rule).
156. E.g., Meyer, supra note 29, at 127-28 nn.67-68 (listing statutes that expressly limit
their territorial reach only to the United States and other statutes that expressly provide for
extraterritorial application).
157. If statutes sometimes state that they only apply domestically, is this evidence that
Congress normally intends statutes to apply only domestically, or does one take the negative
implication and assume Congress meant silent statutes to apply extraterritorially? Does the
answer to such a question change if statutes sometimes state that they apply extrater-
ritorially? Since statutes do both, what does this say?
158. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying  text.
159. E.g., Meyer, supra note 29, at 128 (noting that most federal statutes say nothing about
their territorial reach).
160. For example, the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2012),
amended the Sherman Act to provide that the Sherman Act would not apply to non-import
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often sui generis territorial connections that might exist in different
types of statutes,161 it seems implausible that courts could credibly
claim sufficient observational experience in order to figure out what
is the norm. Hence, the observational rationale only gets us to the
“half-full” viewpoint of extraterritoriality—extraterritoriality exists
if there is absolutely no territorial contact—but not to any middle
ground.
B. The Legislative Purpose Rationale
In ARAMCO—which marked the increased affinity of the Su-
preme Court for the presumption against extraterritoriality162—the
Court identified two other purposes behind the presumption. First,
it “serves to protect against unintended clashes between our laws
and those of other nations which could result in international
discord.”163 I will label this the international relations rationale.
Second, it reflects the notion that, in legislating, Congress “is pri-
marily concerned with domestic conditions.”164 I will label this the
legislative purpose (or “not our problem”) rationale. These
rationales, while very different, are not mutually exclusive. The
legislative purpose rationale asserts a lack of reason for applying
U.S. law abroad,165 whereas the international relations rationale
asserts reasons for not applying U.S. law abroad. Hence, in a
situation in which there may be some marginal legislative purpose
served by applying U.S. law abroad, concern over international
trade unless there is a “direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect” in the United
States. Does this mean that Congress ordinarily thinks that a direct, substantial and
reasonably foreseeable effect is sufficient (or necessary) to establish territoriality (at least if
focusing on effects rather than conduct as the basis for territoriality)?
161. For example, the Supreme Court’s location of the purchase or sale of the securities test
may make sense for the reach of a prohibition on fraud in connection with the purchase or sale
of securities, but if section 10(b) read this way, it could tell us little regarding what Congress
intended for the reach of the Sherman Act’s prohibition on combinations in restraint of trade
or monopolization. Conversely, the test for application of the Sherman Act in the Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, which looks to effects on import or export trade, would
make no sense applied to fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.
162. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
163. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (ARAMCO ), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
164. Id.
165. Implicit within the lack of a reason is the notion that it is therefore not worth the
judicial and enforcement resources it would take to do so.
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relations might tip the balance against doing so; whereas in a
situation in which there may be some marginal impact on
international relations, the lack of a strong impact on advancing the
legislative purpose could tip the balance. On the other hand, the
analysis of what is or is not an extraterritorial application of law
sufficient to invoke the presumption against extraterritoriality may
be quite different under these two rationales.
William Dodge has attempted to turn lemons into lemonade by
claiming that Morrison’s focus test is an effort to apply the legisla-
tive purpose rationale.166 He argues that statutory “focus” means
basing the presumption against extraterritoriality upon where the
effect occurred that motivated the legislation; specifically, situations
in which the motivating effect occurs inside the United States do
not trigger the presumption against extraterritoriality, whereas
situations in which the motivating effect occurs outside the United
States trigger the presumption.167 This builds on Professor Dodge’s
earlier work in which he argues that basing the presumption
against extraterritoriality upon where the relevant effects occur is
not only sensible—because Congress enacts laws to prevent
undesired effects and generally cares only about such effects in the
United States—but also reconciles various Supreme Court opinions
dealing with potentially extraterritorial applications of law.168
The Court’s opinion in Morrison provides support for Professor
Dodge’s thesis. Following the statement that the presumption is
based upon the perception that Congress ordinarily legislates about
domestic matters—from which one might draw the observational
rationale for the presumption—the Morrison opinion quotes
ARAMCO’s statement that Congress is “primarily concerned with
domestic conditions” and explains that the presumption exists re-
gardless of conflict with foreign laws.169 This may suggest the Court
believed that the territoriality observed in congressional statutes
stems from a limited legislative purpose rather than an interna-
tional relations concern, or simply an unthinking application of
legal tradition. Moreover, as discussed above, if one conceptualizes
166. Dodge, supra note 99, at 687.
167. Id. at 690.
168. Dodge, supra note 27, at 90.
169. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877-78 (2010) (quoting ARAMCO,
499 U.S. at 248 (1991)).
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Morrison’s location of the purchase or sale test in terms of conduct
and effects, the test looks to the location of one effect (the purchase
or sale at a price impacted by fraud) rather than the location of the
defendant’s wrongful conduct (the fraudulent misrepresentation).170
In the end, however, Professor Dodge’s “effects” interpretation of
Morrison faces the same problem as Morrison’s focus test without
this interpretation. To see why, return again to the classic cross-
border shooting example. The general view of this example is that
the conduct occurs where the shooter pulls the trigger and the effect
occurs where the bullet fatally impacts the victim.171 Following the
logic of Professor Dodge’s location of the effects argument, Congress
is presumably concerned about the fatality. Hence, applying U.S.
law to the situation in which the victim is standing on the U.S. side
of the border would not trigger the presumption against extraterri-
toriality, whereas applying U.S. law when the shooter stands in the
United States and the victim is across the border would trigger the
presumption.172 Incidentally, the same analysis should apply to a
shooting across state borders in the United States. Under Professor
Dodge’s analysis, the legislature of the state in which the victim was
standing would wish to prosecute, whereas the legislature of the
state in which the shooter stood would be unconcerned.
Although this analysis might reflect a certain cold calculation, it
is unlikely to reflect the intent of a legislature confronted with a
cross-border shooting in which the shooter stood within its territory.
We can say this with some confidence because the law in every state
makes shooting at someone with intent to kill a crime—attempted
murder—even if the shooter missed,173 meaning that all the ele-
ments of at least some crime took place within the nation in which
the shooter stood. This, in turn, forces us to ask why legislatures, in
170. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
172. To say that applying U.S. law is extraterritorial when the shooter is here and the
victim on the other side of the border, but applying U.S. law is not extraterritorial when the
victim is here and the shooter is on the other side of the border, is obviously such a
counterintuitive use of the term extraterritorial that Professor Dodge prefers to talk about
what triggers the presumption against extraterritoriality, rather than what is or is not an
extraterritorial application of a statute. Dodge, supra note 27, at 88 n.25. In correspondence
with the author, Professor Dodge retreated a bit from looking solely to the location of the
effect and agreed that a legislature would wish to prohibit shooting at people on the other side
of the border.
173. See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 133, at 374.
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the case of crimes complete upon the attempt at harmful conse-
quences (attempt crimes), punish conduct seemingly without any
effect (in any territory) and what this tells us about legislative
purposes and cross-border misconduct.
The rationales for punishing attempt crimes include: (1) deterring
the underlying crime, (2) allowing police to intervene before success-
ful completion of the underlying crime, and (3) removing the danger
of a future crime by incarcerating someone who has shown him or
herself willing to act on criminal intent.174 Under Professor Dodge’s
analysis, presumably the legislature of the territory in which the
shooter stood would be no more interested in punishing the attempt
in order to deter the murder than it would be in punishing the
murder when the target is across the border. One might say the
same thing about allowing police to intervene before successful
completion of the underlying crime when the target is across the
border, except for one critical point: presumably, the nation in which
the shooter stood would not wish police from across the border to
enter its territory in order to prevent the shooting, but would want
police from across the border to prevent a shooting at someone on its
side. Hence, the nation in which the shooter stood would have an
interest in allowing its police to act against the attempt because of
the impact on relations with its neighbor. We shall return to this
point later in discussing why the presumption against extraterrito-
riality should have two sides. Finally, the rationale of incarcerating
a dangerous individual (which, by the way, would apply with the
successful murder as well as the unsuccessful one) would seem
apropos to the nation’s legislature where the shooter stands—unless
there is a reason to believe the shooter will never turn his sights to
targets within the territory. This last rationale shows that there is
an effect (more precisely a risk of a future effect) calling for
punishing the conduct in the nation in which the shooter stood. All
told, this discussion shows that deciding whether to trigger the
presumption against extraterritoriality by the location of the effects
which motivated the legislation is not simple in the simple cross-
border shooting case.
Matters become even more complicated when one turns from
shootings to economic crime, such as securities fraud. Securities
174. Id. at 381-82.
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fraud may impact investors, companies (both those who commit the
fraud175 and those who do not176), securities markets,177 and the
broader economy.178 Under these circumstances, it is hardly
straightforward to specify which effects in the United States from
securities fraud reaching beyond the country would be of a nature
and magnitude to concern Congress.179
175. Some scholars argue that securities fraud hurts the companies whose managers
engage in such fraud by preventing the existing shareholders and the broader market from
receiving accurate information about the companies’ performance so that the existing
shareholders or hostile acquirers may replace poor managers. This increases the agency costs
(losses due to dishonest or incompetent management) incurred by public corporations. E.g.,
Merritt B. Fox, Fraud-on-the-Market Class Actions Against Foreign Issuers 19-24 (Columbia
Law Sch. Ctr. for Law & Econ. Studies, Paper No. 400, 2011), available at http://perma.cc/
ZVT-35W8.
176. Economists commonly assert that securities fraud hurts honest companies by forcing
them to compete in a “lemons market” in which investors discount the shares of all companies
because of the risk of fraud perpetrated by some companies. This raises the cost of capital for
honest companies. E.g., Samuel W. Buell, What is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511, 570-71
(2011).
177. The willingness of investors to trade in a market may depend upon whether investors
fear that fraudulent misrepresentations are impacting the prices the investors pay and
receive. See, e.g., Securities and Exchange Commission, The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC
Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation,
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml [http://perma.cc/KU8Q-MTDH]  (“When the stock
market crashed in October 1929, public confidence in the markets plummeted.”).
178. Conventional wisdom when Congress enacted the securities laws (as reflected in
congressional hearings) believed that the 1929 stock market crash, triggering the Great
Depression, represented the collapse of a market bubble created in large part by fraud. E.g.,
H.R. Rep. No. 73-85, at 2 (1933).
179. If the purpose of section 10(b) is to protect investors, then one might argue that
Congress would want to protect U.S. investors even if they trade overseas and not protect
foreign investors even if they trade in the United States. If the purpose is to limit agency costs
incurred by firms whose managers preserve their positions and compensation through fraud,
then presumably the key factor is whether managers of U.S. firms or foreign firms are
committing the fraud. On the other hand, if the purpose is to protect honest firms facing a
“lemons market” problem, then the nationality of the honest firms, rather than of the firms
committing fraud, seemingly becomes the relevant factor. Before assuming this argues in
favor of applying section 10(b) to fraud anywhere in the world, one must ask whether
investors will discount shares in U.S. firms because of fraud in foreign firms, or whether
instead, investors will differentiate firms depending upon the applicable securities laws. If the
purpose is to prevent economic dislocations caused by stock market bubbles and busts, then
one must ask how insulated is the U.S. economy from bubbles and busts on non-U.S.
securities exchanges in an increasingly global economy. Hence, the only effect that seems to
provide a straightforward correlation between territory and purpose is if the rationale is to
promote trading in U.S. stock markets by providing those trading on such markets with
protection against fraud.
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All of this is not to say that courts should ignore the effects that
motivated the legislation in deciding if Congress intended the
legislation to apply to a cross-border situation. On the contrary, this
line of inquiry is entirely sensible. Indeed, it is simply a common-
sense and commonplace application of the principle of statutory
construction that asks whether applying a statute in a given
situation would or would not advance the purposes for which the
legislature acted.180 The problem, as with Morrison’s determination
of statutory focus, is how to figure out what the presumption against
extraterritoriality does in all this. In other words, if the court must
first figure out whether it would advance the statute’s purposes to
apply the statute to the case at hand, the court has already resolved
the issue of whether the statute should apply before the court has
ever invoked the presumption.181
Perhaps one might argue that the presumption regarding
extraterritoriality is useful in separating the effects that count
(those in the United States) from those that do not (those outside
the United States) in searching for congressional purpose behind
a statute. Admittedly, Congress generally acts because of some
impact on its constituents in the United States. Still, this often may
not tell us anything useful. To understand why, consider a statute
that would impose sanctions on those committing genocide
abroad—which seems clearly extraterritorial. One suspects that the
motive, however, would be to avoid the pangs of guilt those in the
United States feel if we stand by idly. Hence, one can find domestic
effects in virtually all congressional legislation. It is therefore neces-
sary to figure out the purpose of the legislation and whether apply-
ing the legislation to a situation in which some conduct or effect
occurs abroad, while some conduct or effect occurs domestically, will
180. See Legal Information Institute, Statutory Construction, http://www.law.cornell. edu/
wex/statutory_construction [http://perma.cc/PR82-UVUD].
181. Of course, under normal statutory interpretation, the court must also consider the
statute’s language and not just the legislative purpose in deciding if the statute applies in a
given situation. Yet, the court still must examine the statutory language even if the court
applies the presumption against extraterritoriality, because the court must then check
whether the statute’s language rebuts the presumption. Although one might argue that
applying the presumption against extraterritoriality casts the statutory language into a
subordinate role, it is unlikely in any context that courts will find a statute applies, absent
compelling statutory language, when applying the statute does not advance the legislative
purpose.
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advance this purpose. As the examples of both cross-border
shootings and cross-border securities fraud show, the presumption
against extraterritoriality can add little to this analysis.
As of this point, the presumption against extraterritoriality seems
only to establish that Congress probably did not intend its legisla-
tion to apply in the absence of any conduct or effect in the United
States. This is not to say that the presence of any territorial
connection means the statute applies. The statute’s language or the
fact that applying the statute will not advance the purpose behind
the legislation may convince a court that Congress did not intend
the statute to apply to a cross-border situation—just as the statute’s
language or purpose may convince a court that the statute does not
apply to all sorts of situations. The concept of territoriality raises
the issue of whether Congress intended the legislation to apply in
the cross-border situation; but the presumption against extraterrito-
riality is useless—unless one takes the half-empty viewpoint that
any conduct or effect outside the country triggers the presump-
tion—because it does not tell a court to presume that Congress
viewed the situation at hand to involve extraterritoriality.182
182. One might argue that the presumption against extraterritoriality has utility, even
under a test that determines extraterritoriality by asking whether Congress would want the
statute to apply to the situation facing the court, because it provides a hook for the court to
ask about the impact of conduct or effect outside the United States on whether the statute
should apply. Such a hook is not needed for most issues of statutory interpretation (for
example, whether the prohibition on fraud in connection with the sale of a security applies
to contributions to a union pension plan, see Int’l. Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551
(1979)) because the statute’s language triggers the inquiry—whether a union pension plan is
a “security.” By contrast, such a hook is needed for an inquiry prompted by conduct or effect
outside the United States in order to trigger an inquiry into whether the statute applies
despite the lack of any language in the statute saying it should not, and, at the same time, to
distinguish this issue from other issues (for example, whether a prohibited action occurs on
a Wednesday rather than on a Tuesday), which we can quickly say Congress does not care
about. In this sense, the presumption is simply that Congress cares about the territorial reach
of its statutes, even though it did not say so, and even though one cannot presume what this
specifically means as far as Congress’s intended reach for the particular statute.
The problem with using the presumption against extraterritoriality in this manner is that
it conflicts with the normal understanding of presumptions regarding legislative intent
generally and the impact of the presumption against extraterritoriality particularly, and as
such can confuse a court. For example, in Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010), the Supreme
Court criticized the Second Circuit for ignoring the presumption against extraterritoriality,
which makes no sense if the presumption against extraterritoriality, simply means the court
should ask whether Congress meant the statute to address the claim given its connection to
nations beyond our own. After all, in its conduct and effects test, the Second Circuit did not
ignore the question. Moreover, under this interpretation of the so-called presumption against
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C. The International Relations Rationale
1. Why This Works
Before concluding that we cannot find a reasonable test for
triggering the presumption against extraterritoriality when some
conduct or effect occurs both inside and outside the nation, we must
examine whether the international relations rationale might pro-
vide a useful guidepost. In fact, the Second Circuit attempted this
in the conduct and effects test that the Supreme Court rejected in
Morrison. In developing the conduct and effects test, the Second Cir-
cuit stated that it presumed Congress would not wish to apply the
Securities Exchange Act in a manner that would offend what the
Second Circuit referred to as foreign relations law183—by which the
court meant the principles laid out in the Restatement of this title.184
A presumption based upon the international relations rationale
avoids the circularity problem found with Morrison’s focus test or its
cousin that asks whether applying the statute to the situation would
advance the legislative purpose. Looking at the impact on
international relations from applying the statute does not force the
Court to determine Congress’s intent regarding the particular
statute as a predicate for invoking a presumption to determine
Congress’s intent. In the language of statistics, one must introduce
an independent variable to break the circularity. A negative impact
extraterritoriality, the only relevant rebuttal is evidence that Congress did not care about
territorial connections at all (for example, it intended to follow universal jurisdiction).
Accordingly, courts must resist the strong temptation to judge arguments about what sort of
territorial connection Congress intended against any sort of presumption that the statute
should not apply. Again, it appears Morrison succumbed to the temptation and seemed to be
employing a presumption against application in weighing arguments about whether there was
extraterritoriality and the merits of the conduct and effects test. To avoid this problem, it is
better terminology to refer to the concept of territoriality or the territorial reach of statutes,
rather than refer to a presumption against extraterritoriality, to embody the idea that
application of statutes in a situation in which some events occur overseas is an issue that
might matter.
183. E.g., Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir.
1972) (“[A]bsent the clearest language, Congress will not be assumed to have meant to go
beyond the limits recognized by foreign relations law.”).
184. Eur. and Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas London, 147 F.3d 118,
129 (2d Cir. 1998) (applying the THIRD RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW reason-
ableness criteria); Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1334 (looking to sufficient conduct in the United States
under the examples set out in the SECOND RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW). 
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on international relations serves as such a variable. It allows the
court to divide situations into two camps before the Court evaluates
Congress’s intent regarding the specific statute: (1) situations in
which the proposed application will trigger problems with interna-
tional relations, in which the court demands greater evidence that
Congress intended the statute to apply; and (2) situations in which
the proposed application does not trigger problems with interna-
tional relations. In the latter scenario, the Court simply asks
whether, based upon the language or purpose of the statute,
Congress intended the statute to apply despite some aspects
occurring outside the United States, just as the Court would in any
other case involving statutory interpretation and without prejudg-
ing the answer one way or the other.
This, in turn, raises the question as to why international relations
problems should trigger a presumption against applying the statute.
The answer lies in the consequences of an erroneous interpretation
of the statute. Every case of statutory interpretation involves a risk
that the court will get it wrong—in the sense that the court’s
interpretation differs from what the legislature would have said had
the legislature recognized the ambiguity and voted on its resolution.
As the congressional reactions to both Morrison185 and ARAMCO186
show, Congress can and does rectify such errors.187 Hence, putting
aside problems of political paralysis or general inertia,188 the impact
of the judicial error can be limited to the parties before the court, as
well as similarly situated parties who have already acted. This, of
185. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 929(Y)(a)(2), 124 Stat. 1376 (granting jurisdiction to U.S. courts over government
prosecutions of securities frauds in which conduct constituting a significant step in the
furtherance of the fraud occurs in the United States or conduct outside the United States has
a foreseeable substantial effect in the United States). The reference to “jurisdiction,” rather
than to whether the acts violate section 10(b), seems to be a mistake resulting from the quick
drafting necessary to respond to Morrison if the provision was to make it into the Dodd-Frank
Act. See, e.g., Marc I. Steinberg & Kelly Flanagan, Transnational Dealings—Morrison
Continues to Make Waves, 46 INT’L. LAW. 829, 842 (2012).
186. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(f), 2000e-1(b) to (c) (2012) (covering employment of U.S. citizens
in foreign countries).
187. Congress legislatively overturned perhaps the first Supreme Court opinion in the area,
which had limited the coverage of the anti-pirate law of 1790. E.g., Knox, supra note 21, at
363. 
188. E.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 155, at 279 (explaining that the burden of inertia means
that presumptions have allocational consequences). 
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course, is unfortunate, but is only one of many sources of potential
error in litigation. Thus, there is really little reason to put a thumb
on the scale to avoid either applying a statute when this goes
beyond what Congress had in mind or not applying a statute to a
situation that Congress did have in mind. Instead, the court must
simply do the best it can to determine Congress’s intent. Once we
introduce international relations concerns, however, this analysis
changes. In this case, applying the statute carries the risk of
causing diplomatic discord.189 If Congress feels that achieving its
objectives are worth such discord, this is Congress’s prerogative. On
the other hand, the Court may wish to make sure that this, in fact,
is what Congress really intended before causing discord that
Congress may not fully dissipate by later amending the law. Hence,
a presumption that demands some greater level of confidence that
Congress intended a statute to apply in such a way as to negatively
impact international relations makes sense.190
2. Refining the Test
We still face the question of what constitutes an international
relations concern sufficient to trigger the presumption against
extraterritoriality. The answer to this question is challenging
because there are different degrees of international relations con-
cerns—just as there are different degrees of territorial connection.
At one extreme is the attempt to apply U.S. law when such applica-
tion would violate international law. Equating the presumption
against extraterritoriality with this level of international relations
concern would reduce the presumption against extraterritoriality to
189. E.g., Born, supra note 103, (describing controversy and retaliation caused by
application of U.S. antitrust laws to foreign conduct under the effects test); Hannah L.
Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 251, 292-305 (2006)
(outlining sources of conflict in application of U.S. laws to conduct outside the United States);
Meyer, supra note 29, at 116-17 (describing possible responses of foreign governments to
extraterritorial application of U.S. laws).
190. There are other statutory presumptions one can view as reflecting a similar
philosophy of dealing with the consequences of erroneous interpretations of legislative intent
by requiring greater certainty before interpreting the statute in a manner that imposes
serious negative consequences. See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 133, at 47-48 (discussing the
rule of lenity under which courts strictly construe criminal statutes). 
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a subset of the presumption that Congress does not intend its stat-
utes to violate international law (the Charming Betsy doctrine).191
At the other extreme, one could find an international relations
concern whenever any nation objects to the application of U.S.
law.192 In fact, the Morrison opinion’s citation of amicus briefs from
foreign governments suggested a bit of this approach. The advan-
tage of this approach is that it seems fairly objective insofar as the
trigger to extraterritoriality is evidence of actual diplomatic discord.
On the other hand, one may worry that this approach gives undue
control to foreign governments to influence the reach of U.S. law by
objections that might reflect simply political expediency at a
particular instant rather than a longstanding principled position.
Accordingly, once again a court might seek a reasonable middle
ground.
The Second Circuit found such a middle ground by looking to the
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law.193 The Restatement lists the
five bases discussed earlier194 under which nations may apply their
laws (so-called prescriptive jurisdiction): territoriality, nationality
(of the defendant), passive personality (nationality of the victim),
protective (of some particular governmental interest) and univer-
sal.195 The Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, however,
qualifies the ability of a nation to apply its law based upon the
191. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 2 U.S. (1 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (“[A]n act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains.”). There is nothing necessarily wrong with this result insofar as it
would return the presumption against extraterritoriality to its roots. E.g., DAVID L. SLOSS ET
AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 37-39 (2011).
192. Such objections might come directly or through expressions of concern from the
executive branch. In this regard, it is worth noting that paying attention to expressions of
concern from the executive branch in deciding whether hostile foreign reaction will arise from
applying a statute is not the same as simply letting the executive branch decide whether or
not the statute should apply in the situation at hand. Rather, the court would be drawing on
the executive branch’s expertise in asking the factual question of whether a proposed
application of U.S. law would trigger hostile foreign reactions such that the court should be
more certain that this is what Congress really had in mind.
193. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
195. 3D RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 39, §§ 402, 404. Reflecting
some traditional opposition in U.S. jurisprudence to passive personality (protection of
nationals hurt outside the nation) as a basis for prescriptive jurisdiction, the Restatement only
lists this basis for prescriptive jurisdiction in the comments, rather than the black letter. Id.
§ 402 cmt. g.
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presence of some conduct or effect in the nation’s territory. First, the
conduct must occur at least “in substantial part” in the nation, or
else must have (or be intended to have) at least a “substantial effect”
in the nation,196 thereby excluding application of the nation’s law
based only on some slight conduct or effect occurring in the nation.
Finding this approach not to be sufficiently sensitive on its own, the
Third Restatement goes on in section 403 to state that a nation
should not apply its law despite any of the five bases for doing so
when the application would be unreasonable in the particular
situation.197 In deciding whether applying the nation’s law would be
unreasonable, section 403 lists a number of factors, such as the
degree to which the act occurs in or affects the nation, the nation’s
connections to the person responsible for the regulated acts, the
importance and generally recognized desirability of the regulation,
justified expectations, the interests of other nations, and conflict
with the laws of other nations.198
In evaluating these or other possible tests for when the impact on
international relations is sufficient to invoke the presumption
against extraterritoriality, a good place to start is by asking whether
we could just have stopped with international law. Not only does
compliance with international law invoke its own presumption, but
also foreign government protests often argue that there is a
violation of international law and the drafters of the Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law suggested that their sections on prescriptive
jurisdiction stated international law199—thereby suggesting that
international law might subsume the other possible benchmarks.
On the other hand, daily experience shows that nations regularly
decry the actions of other nations in situations that do not arise to
the level of violations of international law. Moreover, it is highly
doubtful that section 403 of the Third Restatement in fact restates
the customary international law regarding when it is permissible for
a nation to apply its law.200
196. Id. § 402(1)(a), (c).
197. Id. § 403(1).
198. Id. § 403(2)(a)-(d), (g)-(h).
199. See id. § 403 cmt. a & reporters’ note 10.
200. E.g., Cecil J. Olmstead, Jurisdiction, 14 YALE J. INT’L L. 468, 472 (1989) (“[I]t seems
implausible that section 403 rises to the level of ... ‘a principle of international law.’ ”).
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Still, there are those who argue that international law provides
all the guidance necessary in deciding when to trigger a presump-
tion against applying a statute to events outside the nation. For
example, John Knox has constructed a sliding scale presumption
based upon the assumption that international law not only prohibits
some efforts by nations to apply their laws beyond their borders, but
also assigns primary jurisdiction to some nations and permissible
concurrent jurisdiction to other nations when it comes to applying
their laws in other situations.201 This, in turn, allows Professor Knox
to suggest no presumption when the United States has primary
jurisdiction, a soft presumption against application when interna-
tional law simply allows the United States concurrent jurisdiction,
and a strong presumption against application when international
law prohibits U.S. jurisdiction.202
One problem with this approach, however, is that it assumes
international law provides more definition in this area than may be
the case. Staying with the examples of cross-border shootings and
securities fraud, it is far from certain that international law
significantly differentiates the rights of either the nation in which
the shooter stands or the fraudulent misrepresentation occurs ver-
sus the nation in which the victim is struck or the securities sale
takes place to proscribe the conduct.203 To the extent that these
201. See Knox, supra note 21, at 355-61.
202. See id.
203. While Professor Knox asserts that international law gives primary jurisdiction to the
nation where the conduct rather than the effects occur, id. at 358-59, it is debatable whether
international law, in fact, draws a significant distinction in this regard. Even a narrow
interpretation of the all-important S.S. Lotus opinion, (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.
10 (Sept. 7), on the international law governing nations’ rights to proscribe conduct occurring
outside their borders would not support such a contention. As Professor Knox points out in
his attempt to limit the “what is not prohibited is allowed” reading of Lotus, the narrow read-
ing is that Turkey had the right to apply its law based upon the impact in Turkish territory
(the death on the Turkish ship) of conduct in French territory (the negligence of the officer on
the French ship in causing the collision). Id. at 60 (“No argument has come to the knowledge
of the Court from which it could be deduced that States recognize themselves to be under an
obligation towards each other only to have regard to the place where the author of the offence
happens to be at the time of the offence. On the contrary, it is certain that the courts of many
countries, even of countries which have given their criminal legislation a strictly territorial
character, interpret criminal law in the sense that offences, the authors of which at the mo-
ment of commission are in the territory of another State, are nevertheless to be regarded as
having been committed in the national territory, if one of the constituent elements of the of-
fence, and more especially its effects, have taken place there.”). In any event, Professor Knox’s
theory still leaves a problem in instances in which the conduct occurs in more than one nation.
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cases fall into the realm in which international law favors neither
nation over the other in applying its law, then, if both nations apply
even a soft presumption against extraterritoriality—and Professor
Knox hopes other nations will adopt his approach and thereby avoid
conflict204—we may well end up with a situation in which neither
nation addresses the cross-border misconduct. Moreover, as the
experience with F-cubed securities fraud cases demonstrates, the
degree of discord resulting from applying a nation’s laws depends
upon a lot more than just where the conduct occurs (which seems to
provide the basis for primary jurisdiction under Professor Knox’s
view of international law).
Moving beyond international law, we might consider whether
conflict of laws principles—so-called private international law—can
provide useful guidance.205 To start with, if one assumes that the
discord from extraterritorial application of law results from the
conflict between U.S. and foreign law, then one might trigger the
presumption against extraterritoriality based upon the existence of
an actual conflict between U.S. law and the law of another nation in
which some conduct or effect also occurred. This fits with Jeffery
Meyer’s dual illegality proposal,206 under which the presumption
against extraterritoriality would not trigger if both nations whose
law might be applicable prohibited the conduct. This, however, mis-
ses possible conflict in remedies and procedure, which can be
extremely important to the actual impact of the prohibition207 and
which have been the source of contention in the securities fraud
area.208 Pointing to this difficulty, Justice Breyer’s opinion in 
204. Knox, supra note 21, at 383.
205. See, e.g., Buxbaum, supra note 29 (comparing approaches in the United States, where
courts have imported conflict of laws principles into deciding whether to apply U.S. regulatory
statutes based upon effects in the United States, with the approach in Germany, where courts
looked to international law limits in deciding whether to apply German regulatory statutes
based upon effects in Germany); William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws
Theory: An Argument for Judicial Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 101, 121 (1998) (noting
that different approaches to determining the extraterritorial scope of regulatory statutes are
based upon different conflict-of-laws theories).
206. Meyer, supra note 29.
207. E.g., Thomas O. Main, The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 87 WASH. U.
L. REV. 801 (2010).
208. See supra note 74 and accompanying text; Buxbaum, see also supra note 189, at 261-
64.
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F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. rejected the “no sub-
stantive law conflict/no problem” argument in the antitrust area.209
On the other side of the equation, it may be too timid of the risk
of international relations consequences to assume that other nations
would be legitimately upset and expect the United States to back
away from applying our law in every situation in which our law
conflicts with theirs. On the other hand, a court might presume that
other nations would be legitimately upset in situations in which
laws conflict and conflict of laws principles (putting aside for the
moment differences regarding the appropriate principles) call for
the other nation’s law to apply.
In fact, this sort of thinking is embedded into the Third Restate-
ment of Foreign Relations Law and, for a time, influenced some U.S.
Courts of Appeals in dealing with the application of U.S. antitrust
laws to events abroad. Specifically, the multifactor reasonableness
approach of section 403 of the Third Restatement of Foreign
Relations Law draws at least in part from the multifactor approach
of the Second Conflict of Laws Restatement.210 In the 1970s and
1980s, some circuit courts,211 starting with the Ninth Circuit in
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,212 began importing this
sort of multifactor approach into cases dealing with the application
of the Sherman Act to anticompetitive activities outside the United
States.213 Ultimately, however, this approach faded from the anti-
trust scene in the face of congressional action to clarify the reach of
209. 542 U.S. 155, 167-68 (2004).
210. 3D RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 39, § 403 reporters’ note 10.
211. E.g., Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax Inc., 661 F.2d 864, 869-70 (10th Cir. 1981); Nat’l
Bank of Can. v. Interbank Card Ass’n, 666 F.2d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1981); In re Uranium Antitrust
Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1255-56 (7th Cir. 1980); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595
F.2d 1287, 1297 (3d Cir. 1979).
212. 549 F.2d 597, 614 & n.31 (9th Cir. 1976).
213. Among the factors these courts weighed were: (1) the degree of conflict between U.S.
and foreign law or policy; (2) the nationality of the parties; (3) the relative significance of
effects in the United States as opposed to elsewhere; (4) whether the defendant intended to
affect U.S. commerce or, if not, whether the effect was foreseeable; (5) the extent of any
activity within the United States; (6) the enforceability of any remedy ordered; (7) the
availability of a remedy abroad; (8) the effect of exercising jurisdiction on foreign relations;
(9) the U.S. reaction if the roles were reversed; (10) whether the relief demanded will subject
the defendant to conflicting requirements under U.S. and foreign law; and (11) the impact of
any relevant treaties. E.g., Mannington Mills, Inc., 595 F.2d at 1297-98; Timberlane Lumber
Co., 549 F.2d at 614.
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the Sherman Act,214 and Supreme Court opinions dealing with the
reach of the Sherman Act,215 which, for the most part, did not
employ this approach.216
Assuming conflict of laws principles can aid courts in determining
whether a situation is likely to produce the sort of negative foreign
government reactions that should trigger the presumption against
extraterritoriality, we still have the question of which conflict of
laws approach to use. As stated above, the Third Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law borrowed from the multifactor approach of
the Second Conflict of Laws Restatement217 and, in turn, influenced
both the Timberlane line of cases in antitrust as well as the Second
Circuit’s conduct and effects test for securities fraud.218 By contrast,
Morrison’s end result actually parallels the rules-based approach in
the First Conflict of Laws Restatement under which, in the event of
a conflict, the law of the jurisdiction in which the injury occurs
governs a claim for recovery in tort.219 Indeed, in many ways,
Morrison represented a victory for the bright line virtues of the
rules approach to conf licts represented by the First Conflict of Laws
Restatement over the nuanced multifactor approach of the Second
214. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2012).
215. See F. Hoffmann-La Roche v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004); Hartford Fire
Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 794-99 (1993).
216. The legislative history of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act indicated
that Congress did not intend to preclude courts from also continuing to limit coverage of the
Sherman Act based upon a multifactor approach, so long as the courts, at the very least,
limited coverage of the Sherman Act to the direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable
effects specified in the amendment. H.R. Rep. No. 97-686 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2498. While Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Hartford Fire Insurance
invoked the approach of section 403 and Timberlane in considering the reach of the Sherman
Act, 509 U.S. at 817-19, the majority ignored it. The majority of the Supreme Court in
Empagran invoked the reasonableness idea of section 403 of the Restatement in considering
the reach of the Sherman Act, but, in the end, did not find much effect in the United States
and so never got into balancing interests by using the various factors listed in section 403 and
applied in the Timberlane line of cases. Empagran 542 U.S. 155; e.g., Buxbaum, supra note
29, at 652.
217. See Buxbaum, supra note 29, at 647-48, 650.
218. E.g., Eur. and Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas London, 147 F.3d
118, 129 (2d Cir. 1998) (applying Restatement of Foreign Relations Law reasonableness
criteria).
219. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377-78, 384 (1934) [hereinafter FIRST
CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT]. In fact, the First Conflict of Laws Restatement specifically
treats the place of reliance, rather than the place of the misrepresentation, as the place of the
wrong for purposes of providing the governing law in the case of a conflict between the laws
potentially governing a tort claim for fraud. Id. § 377 illus. 5 & 6.
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Conflict of Laws Restatement.220 On the other hand, if the idea is to
figure out when application of U.S. law will trigger principled
opposition by foreign governments, maybe courts should look at
conflict of laws rules followed in other nations.
In the end, the lack of consensus on either international law
limits to applying a nation’s law beyond its borders or on the
appropriate approach to resolving conflict of laws may suggest a
more pragmatic approach. To begin with, there does not need to be
a single trigger point for determining extraterritoriality under the
international relations rationale. Instead, a court could trigger the
presumption in various situations suggesting international relations
problems, but as suggested by Professor Knox,221 with different
degrees of strength. This follows from the rationale for the presump-
tion as a tool to deal with the risk of collateral consequences from an
erroneous interpretation of congressional intent. Therefore, the
greater the consequences, the stronger the presumption should be.
So, if the risk were a violation of international law, there would be
a strong presumption against extraterritoriality to the point of jus-
tifying a clear statement rule.222 To the extent that the risk is
simply to face objection from some foreign governments, then a
court might require relatively little to overcome the presumption.223
If the risk is something in between, then courts can require an
intermediate level of rebuttal.
Moreover, as one test of likely negative foreign reaction, courts
might follow a golden rule approach; we can presume that foreign
220. Before assuming that the First Conflict of Laws Restatement commands the result in
Morrison, it is important to keep in mind that this rule is triggered by the presence of a
conflict between the laws otherwise applicable based upon the explicit premise that each state
along the chain of conduct and effect has the right to apply its law. Id. § 377. Indeed, the
Second Restatement of Foreign Relations Law in 1965 (before the conflicts and effects test)
explicitly provided that a nation in which a misrepresentation occurs has jurisdiction to apply
its criminal law even though the transaction in reliance on the misrepresentation occurs in
another nation. 2D RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 4, § 17 illus. 2.
221. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
222. E.g., McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Hond., 372 U.S. 10, 21-22
(1963).
223. Following this sort of approach, the Morrison majority may have been right to trigger
some presumption against extraterritoriality based upon the amicus briefs from foreign
governments. Such a slight presumption, however, should not have outweighed forty years
of congressional acquiescence in, and the SEC’s support for, the Second Circuit’s conduct and
effects test, especially given the negative implications of section 30(b).
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governments will legitimately object to applying U.S. laws in
situations in which we in the United States would object if the shoe
was on the other foot and a foreign government was the one ap-
plying its statute to actions having a U.S. nexus. Actual examples
of objections by the United States could provide evidence of U.S.
attitudes, as might the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law. After
all, whether the provisions of the Restatement reflect international
law, they reflect the attitude of an influential body of legal thinkers
within the United States and, hence, in the absence of a better
source, they provide a reasonably proxy for when application of law
by another country would upset us in the United States. In addition,
the Restatement’s multifactor reasonableness approach appears to
provide a fairly comprehensive list of all the sort of facts one might
wish to examine in asking whether to legitimately expect com-
plaints from foreign governments if the United States were to apply
its laws to events at least partially outside its borders.
3. The Wrong Presumption?
Determining extraterritoriality by the presence of international
relations concerns raises the possible objection, which I label “the
wrong box,” that we have shifted into a different presumption. The
Supreme Court cases dealing with the overseas reach of the
Sherman Act in the post-ARAMCO era illuminate the issue.
This taxonomy begins with Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in
Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California.224 In Hartford, the Su-
preme Court upheld the application of the Sherman Act to conduct
that had an anticompetitive effect in California, but was legal in
England where the conduct occurred.225 Because of prior decisions
applying the Sherman Act to overseas conduct, the presumption
against extraterritoriality did not bother either the majority of the
court in Hartford (who did not even explicitly mention the presump-
tion) or Justice Scalia in his dissent. However, Justice Scalia viewed
the conflict between the prohibition under U.S. law versus the
legality of the defendants’ conduct under English law as triggering
the rule that courts should construe statutes to avoid violating
224. 509 U.S. 764, 816-22 (1993) (Scalia, J. dissenting).
225. See id. at 794-99 (majority opinion).
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international law; into which Justice Scalia threw the reasonable-
ness approach of section 403 of the Restatement of Foreign Relations
Law and notions of “prescriptive comity”226 (as in the Timberlane
line of circuit court decisions227). This demarcation between the
presumption against extraterritoriality and construing statutes
ostensibly to avoid violating international law is consistent with
Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Morrison, in which he wrote
that the presumption against extraterritoriality is not based on
comity or conflict with other nations’ laws.228
In F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., Justice Breyer
imported Justice Scalia’s taxonomy from a dissent into the opinion
for the Court.229 In many ways, Justice Breyer’s opinion supports
some of the approach recommended in this article. In Empagran,
foreign plaintiffs sought recovery for damages they suffered by the
implementation outside the United States of an international price
fixing conspiracy among producers of vitamins.230 Reacting to
foreign government displeasure at the remedy (rather than the
prohibition),231 the Court invoked the reasonableness standard in
section 403 of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law (in gestalt
if not in detail insofar as the Court rejected the multiple factor
approach) to tip the balance against applying the Sherman Act.232
However, the opinion did not express reliance on the presumption
against extraterritoriality. Instead, the Court stated that it was
looking to a rule under which courts construe statutes to avoid
unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other
nations, which the court, citing Justice Scalia’s dissent in Hartford,
treated as part of the rule calling for construing statutes to avoid
violation of international law.233
226. Id. at 817-19 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
227. See supra notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
228. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877-78 (2010).
229. 542 U.S. 155, 167-68 (2004).
230. Id. at 159.
231. Not surprisingly, the displeasure came from the home countries of the defendant
corporations rather than of the plaintiff consumers. Ralf Michaels, Empagran’s Empire:
International Law and Statutory Interpretation in the U.S. Supreme Court of the Twenty-First
Century, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 542
(David L. Sloss et al. eds., 2011).
232. See Empagran, 542 U.S. at 165-66.
233. Id. at 164.
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To assess this taxonomy, it helps to think in terms of three boxes.
One box represents application of U.S. law to events outside the
United States in which this would violate clearly established inter-
national law. The second box represents applications of U.S. law
when no conduct or effect occurs within the United States. The third
box represents application of U.S. law to events outside the United
States where this would produce international discord. These boxes
overlap—for example, applications of U.S. law in situations that
would violate international law are a subset of applications that
create international discord, as are some applications of U.S. law
when no conduct or effect occurs within the United States—but it is
unnecessary for our purposes to sort all this out. The rule that
construes statutes to avoid violations of international law handles
the box in which application of U.S. law to events beyond our border
would violate clearly established international law. A presumption
against extraterritoriality justified solely upon the observational
rationale that Congress does not normally think in terms of the non-
territorial principles in conceiving of the reach of its legislation
handles the box in which no conduct or effect occurs in the United
States. The question is what to do about situations in which
application of U.S. law to events beyond our borders would produce
international discord (the third box), but applying U.S. law would
not violate clearly established international law and when some
conduct or some effect occurs in the United States (so as not to come
within the other two boxes).
Justice Scalia’s solution in Hartford is to expand the violation of
international law box by viewing international law as encompassing
prescriptive comity and the reasonableness approach of the Restate-
ment of Foreign Relations Law when dealing with conflict between
U.S. and foreign laws.234 The problem with this solution, is that
customary international law probably does not require such comity
or reasonableness.235 At times in Empagran, Justice Breyer followed
Justice Scalia’s view of the limits imposed by international law on
a nation’s ability to apply its law to events beyond its borders.236 At
234. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 818-19 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
235. E.g., Phillip R. Trimble, The Supreme Court and International Law: The Demise of
Restatement Section 403, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 53, 54 (1995); see supra note 200 and accom-
panying text. 
236. Empragan, 542 U.S. at 164.
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other times, however, Justice Breyer seemed to invoke a new rule
of construction—under which the Court construes statutes to avoid
unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other
nations (which I will call the “good neighbor presumption”) even if
the Court cannot cite any authority showing such interference
violates customary international law.237 Showing some resistance to
the proliferation of presumptions, this different presumption seems
not to have caught on in any later opinion. Finally, by invoking
international relations concerns as a rationale for the presumption
against extraterritoriality, the Supreme Court, in opinions ranging
from ARAMCO to its recent decision in Kiobel, has suggested, as
argued in this Article, that the presumption against extraterritorial-
ity is the home for cases in which application of U.S. law to events
occurring at least in part outside the United States will upset other
nations, even without violating international law.238
In the end, so long as everyone understands what is going on, this
sort of terminological debate can be left to the purists. None of the
three taxonomies is free from the potential for misunderstanding.
Stretching the term “international law” may be good for law school
brochures but can create controversy over what, in fact, is the
customary international law in the area. Creating a third presump-
tion might clarify or might get things more confused.239 So, we are
left with using the presumption against extraterritoriality and
making the best of it.
4. A Two-Sided Presumption
An important corollary follows from the international relations
rationale for the presumption against extraterritoriality: interna-
tional relations concerns can cut both ways. It may be that the
failure to apply U.S. law in the situation at hand would place the
United States in violation of international law, elicit objections from
foreign governments, or elicit objection in the United States if a
foreign government were similarly to restrict the application of its
237. Id.
238. See discussion supra Part III.C.2.
239. Professor Knox argues that there should be no presumption against extraterritoriality;
rather, there should be a presumption against extrajurisdictionality. Knox, supra note 21, at
353.
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law. If so, then to avoid the risk of unjustified collateral conse-
quences from an erroneous interpretation of congressional intent,
the court should follow a presumption in favor of applying the
statute.
A situation in which the failure to apply a U.S. statute may have
put the United States in violation of international law occurred in
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.240 There, the Supreme Court
refused to apply a statute, which prohibited the return of aliens to
a country where they faced persecution, to the Coast Guard’s
intercepting Haitian vessels in international waters. Although the
Supreme Court invoked the presumption against extraterritoriality
in reaching this result,241 the dissent242 and others243 claim that this
result put the United States in violation of its treaty obligations.
Regardless of whether the failure to apply the statute in Sale placed
the United States in violation of treaty obligations,244 it is clear that
in other contexts, the failure to apply U.S. laws to situations in
which conduct or effects occur outside the country could place the
United States in violation of international law.245 
In this sort of situation, the doctrine that courts should construe
statutes to avoid violations of international law comes into play
without talking about presumptions regarding extraterritoriality.
On the other hand, determining extraterritoriality in a way in which
the presumption against extraterritoriality could apply to this sort
of situation creates a conflict between presumptions—the presump-
tion that Congress intends its statutes to apply in a way consistent
with international law conflicting with the presumption against
extraterritoriality. Determining extraterritoriality by the presence
of negative international relations consequences from applying the
statute to the situation at hand can remove the conflict, because
240. 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
241. Id. at 173-74. It is open to debate whether the situation in Sale involved extrater-
ritoriality, because, on the one hand, the seizures occurred on international waters, but, on
the other hand, the case involved actions by crew on U.S. government vessels.
242. Id. at 190-98 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
243. E.g., JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS, MASS EXPULSION IN MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
PRACTICE 103 (1995).
244. The majority, not surprisingly, argued that it did not. Sale 509 U.S. at 177-87 (major-
ity opinion).
245. E.g., Knox, supra note 21, at 380-81 (giving examples).
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foreign relations consequences now, in fact, push for application of
the statute.246
Another situation in which failure to apply a nation’s law could
violate international law brings us back to the cross-border shooting
example. Suppose a nation, as a matter of policy, refuses to prevent
or remedy the conduct of persons in its territory who shoot at
persons on the other side of the border—say, for instance, by failing
to act against groups who fire rockets at towns in a neighboring
nation. Such inaction could violate international law.247 Accordingly,
it would seem counter to the international relations rationale be-
hind the presumption against extraterritoriality for courts to invoke
the presumption as a reason to hold that the nation’s laws do not
apply in such a case.
It seems less clear when international law imposes upon a state
the duty to protect against economic crimes, such as securities
fraud, launched from within its borders against victims in other
nations. Still, a nation that allows itself to become the hub from
which dishonest persons send fraudulent investment solicitations
to prospective victims in other nations is likely to provoke negative
reactions from the nations into which the solicitations find their
way. Indeed, efforts by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion to encourage other nations to enforce their laws against secur-
ities fraud248 illustrate that the United States would not be pleased
if other nations made no effort prevent securities fraud launched
from their territory against investors in the United States.249
246. See, e.g., Colangelo, supra note 29, at 1023 (“The tension vanishes, however, in light
of the presumption’s original motivation: to avoid unintended discord with foreign nations.”
(citations omitted)).
247. E.g., Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.) (1938/1941) 3 R.I.A.A. 1905; U.N. Fact-
Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, Rep. on Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied
Territories, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48, para. 1960-61 (Sept. 25, 2009).
248. E.g., Securities Exchange Commission, Office of International Affairs, http://www.
sec.gov/oia/Article/about.html [http://perma.cc/X4LX-3CM5] (last modified Mar. 4, 2014) (“The
[SEC] Office of International Affairs (OIA) promotes investor protection ... by advancing
international regulatory and enforcement cooperation, promoting the adoption of high
regulatory standards worldwide, and formulating technical assistance programs to strengthen
the regulatory infrastructure in global financial markets.... To this end, OIA works with a
global network of securities regulators and law enforcement authorities to facilitate cross-
border regulatory compliance and help ensure that international borders are not used to
escape detection and prosecution of fraudulent securities activities.”).
249. E.g., IIT v. Vencap Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017 (2d Cir. 1975) (“This country would
surely look askance if one of our neighbors stood by silently and permitted misrepresented
2014] DETERMINING EXTRATERRITORIALITY 403
In this instance, invoking the rule construing statutes to comply
with international law might not help. On the other hand, locating
the purpose for the presumption against extraterritoriality in a
rationale that construes statutes to avoid negative international
relations consequences suggests that there should be a presumption
in such cases; specifically, courts should presume that statutes
apply to cross-border misconduct when failure to apply the statute
risks negative international relations consequences—either because
other nations object to the lack of enforcement or if we in this coun-
try would object if the shoe were on the other foot and other nations
did not enforce their laws against such cross-border misconduct.
This analysis, in turn, brings us to the Solicitor General’s
argument in Morrison that applying section 10(b) to fraudulent con-
duct in the United States was justified in order to prevent the
United States from becoming “the Barbary Coast for those perpe-
trating frauds on foreign securities markets.”250 In fact, this
argument has been a principal rationale by those arguing for
applying section 10(b) in F-cubed cases in which conduct in the
United States leads to losses by foreign investors buying stock in
foreign issuers on foreign markets.251 The Supreme Court in
Morrison rejected this argument.252 Insofar as the Court based its
rejection upon skepticism as to whether the United States is
becoming a hub for transnational securities fraud,253 then this
simply presents an empirical issue. Insofar, however, as the
Supreme Court rejected this contention as just a policy argument
that lacked sufficient support in the statutory text to overcome the
presumption against extraterritoriality, then the Court missed the
broader point. By invoking the Barbary Coast metaphor, the argu-
ment reminds us that the failure to police misconduct within a
nation that produces a negative impact for those beyond its borders
can produce international discord. To the extent that the underlying
purpose for the presumption against extraterritoriality is to avoid
securities to be poured into the United States.”).
250. 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2886 (2010).
251. E.g., SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 1977).
252. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. At 2886.
253. Id.
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discord, then courts should presume the law applies to cases in
which cross-border misconduct risks such a reaction.254
5. Conflicts with Legislative Purpose
The earlier introductory discussion of the legislative purpose and
international relations rationales255 pointed out that these ratio-
nales can be complimentary—the lack of much reason for applying
U.S. law abroad can combine with negative international repercus-
sions from doing so, to lead to the conclusion that U.S. law should
not apply. In such cases, triggering the presumption against
extraterritoriality based upon the presence of international
relations concerns increases analytic clarity by avoiding a test that
turns into circular reasoning, but might not actually change many
results. On the other hand, in numerous cases—especially when
dealing with economic regulations in a global economy—these two
rationales can point in opposite directions.256 Here is where a test
that determines extraterritoriality based upon the presence of
international relations concerns can produce appropriately different
results than a test based upon legislative purpose.
Securities law provides good examples. Start by assuming,
admittedly inaccurately, that the only legislative purpose for
penalizing securities fraud is to protect investors victimized by the
fraud and that Congress is concerned only about its constituents. In
such a case, applying the prohibition consistent with the legislative
purpose suggests it should reach fraudulent transactions that
victimize U.S. investors anywhere in the world and should not reach
fraudulent transactions victimizing foreign investors, even if those
take place in the United States. Putting aside constitutional
considerations, the reason for not following such an approach comes
from international relations concerns—the conflict with foreign re-
gimes created by attempting to apply U.S. law to transactions by
254. This is not to say that an F-cubed case should be treated as territorial. After all,
foreign governments objected to applying U.S. law to F-cubed cases. Hence, there was no
reason for a presumption in favor of territoriality in order to avoid upsetting foreign
governments because of a lack of enforcement. Indeed, insofar as the principal (if not the only
good) reason for applying U.S. law to F-cubed cases would be to maintain good relations, this
foreign reaction suggests U.S. law should not have applied.
255. See supra notes 201-04 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 232-34 and accompanying text.
2014] DETERMINING EXTRATERRITORIALITY 405
U.S. investors anywhere in the world and the probable retaliation
by other nations refusing to protect U.S. investors if we refuse to
protect their investors.
Of course, this illustration does not accurately reflect the policies
behind the prohibition on securities fraud.257 To give an obvious
example, the United States would wish to protect foreign investors
trading in the United States in order to encourage foreign investors
to trade here. On the other hand, with global securities trading
where what happens on stock markets in London, Frankfurt, Hong
Kong, and Tokyo impacts what happens on the New York Stock
Exchange, and in a global economy in which a crisis in Greece can
slow the recovery in the U.S. economy, it is difficult to say that
applying the antifraud provision to transactions outside the United
States would in no way further the legislative purpose behind the
securities laws.258 Hence, the principal reason a court might ques-
tion whether Congress would wish to apply the securities fraud
prohibition to some situations outside the United States is the
international relations concern.
Now we start to see a critical practical advantage of using the
presence of international relations concerns as the measuring point
for determining extraterritoriality. A test that determines extrater-
ritoriality by legislative purpose—as, for example, Professor Dodge’s
lack of effects in the United States test—simply misses the key
issue: so long as it would advance the legislative purpose to apply
the statute, then under this approach, the court does so259 even
though the negative international relations consequences might
have been sufficient to persuade Congress that the statute should
not have applied. The statutory focus test, as Morrison actually
applied the test, avoided this trap—but that was only because the
statutory focus test, as applied in Morrison, really is not about the
focus of the statute. In fact, the only decent argument in the
Morrison opinion’s discussion of so-called focus was to raise the
257. See supra notes 175-79 and accompanying text.
258. E.g., MARC I. STEINBERG ET AL., GLOBAL ISSUES IN SECURITIES LAW, at iii (2013) (“Turn
on the CNBC or Bloomberg cable channels during the middle of the night in the United States
and one quickly realizes that securities markets are global and that what goes on in European
or Asian markets spills over into the United States.”); Buxbaum, supra note 189, at 282
(explaining that the interconnectedness of global securities markets makes territorial
approaches too limiting).
259. Or, at least, is not cautioned against doing so by the risk of negative repercussions.
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objections by foreign governments, which has nothing to do with the
focus of the statute.
A possible objection to determining extraterritoriality by the
presence of international relations concerns, as opposed to the
absence of advancing the legislative purpose, is that this privileges
international relations concerns over Congress’s objectives in pass-
ing the statute.260 This, however, misunderstands what is at stake
in the determination. The point of defining extraterritoriality is to
invoke some degree of presumption against application of the
statute. This could be as weak as simply saying that if the court
cannot figure out whether Congress intended the statute to apply,
then the statute will not apply, or as strong as demanding a clear
statement of contrary intent—depending upon the degree of inter-
national relations concerns implicated. In any situation in which
there is not a clear statement rule, in other words, in any case other
than a violation of international law, then legislative purpose
should fit in the rebuttal analysis one tool in the toolbox for
determining whether Congress wished the statute to apply despite
international relations concerns.261 Hence, using international rela-
tions concerns as the measure of extraterritoriality does not make
those concerns trump legislative purpose—it simply introduces
those concerns into the analysis of whether the statute applies and
tilts the scale to some degree in favor of nonapplication in order to
take into account the asymmetric risk that courts face in deciding
if the Congress intended the statute to apply (including trying to
figure out how much this advances the purpose of the statute).
Incidentally, it is worth noting that, just as there are degrees of
territoriality and of international relations concerns, there are also
degrees of advancing the legislative purpose by applying the statute
to a cross-border situation. This can range from situations in which
it would completely frustrate the purpose of the statute for the court
not to apply it,262 to situations in which plaintiffs advance an imag-
260. See, e.g., Born, supra note 103, at 76 (arguing that the presumption against
extraterritoriality “unduly elevates Congress’s presumed desire to avoid conflicts with foreign
law over other important legislative goals”). 
261. See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 177 (1993) (looking at “all
available evidence about the meaning of” the statute to determine if it applied extraterrit-
orially). 
262. So, for example, refusing to enforce an antipiracy (in the traditional Jolly Roger sense,
as opposed to the intellectual property appropriation sense) statute upon the high seas would
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inative argument as to how it might, by some Rube Goldberg line of
reasoning, marginally advance the statute’s purpose to apply the
statute to the case at hand.263
This, in turn, suggests that courts may face the need to balance
legislative goals versus international repercussions in determining
Congress’s intent when it comes to applying U.S. law to cross-border
situations. One may object to the lack of certainty in such an ap-
proach264 or question the competence of courts to weigh foreign
versus domestic considerations.265 Given, however, that Congress
needs to weigh domestic goals versus international relations
concerns in deciding how its laws should impact cross-border situ-
ations, it is difficult for courts to realistically attempt to reconstruct
Congress’s intent without engaging at all in the exercise. The
presumption against extraterritoriality tempers this balancing by
putting a thumb on the scale against application of the statute
depending upon the degree of international discord risked by an
erroneous judicial determination of the balance Congress would
reach.
CONCLUSION
In the end, the statutory focus test is useless if the presumption
against extraterritoriality is to serve any real function in cross-
border situations in which some conduct or effect exists both within
and outside the nation. Instead, courts should determine whether
to trigger the presumption against extraterritoriality by examining
if the situation presents problems for international relations.
defeat the point of an antipiracy statute.
263. One might wonder whether the argument that prosecuting F-cubed securities frauds
promotes honest markets in the United States fits here.
264. See, e.g., Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An
Intersection Between Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT’L L. 280, 281 (1982)
(referring to court decisions declining to apply U.S. law based upon comity considerations as
an “amorphous never-never land whose borders are marked by fuzzy lines of politics, courtesy,
and good faith”) (citations omitted).
265. E.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism,
37 VA. J. INT’L L. 505, 514-15 (1997) (defending the presumption against extraterritoriality
on the basis of a lack of judicial competence to address policy issues involved with applying
statutes abroad); Dodge, supra note 27, at 120 (agreeing with Bradley that courts are
institutionally ill-equipped to trade off legislative goals against international relations
concerns, but arguing that the answer is to look only to legislative goals).
